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ABSTRACT
PICTORIAL SPACE: A COMPARATIVE ACCOUNT OF 
PROJECTIVE VERSUS CONSTRUCTIVIST 
THEORIES OF GRAPHIC PERCEPTION
Orhan Anafarta 
M.F.A. in Graphical Arts 
Supervisor: Doç. Dr. Mahmut Mutman 
June, 1996
This study aims at constructing an 'overall theoretical outline' 
that would structure the existing approaches to graphic perception 
within a comprehensible whole. In this context, two dominant 
theoretical paradigms, namely 'projective' and 'constructivist' 
arguments of pictorial perception is analysed in a comparative 
manner. Due to the fact that different theorists adopt these two 
arguments in varying degrees, 4 distinct approaches to pictorial 
perception*is analysed extending within two extremes. The comparison 
is based on the phenomenon of pictorial space as a significant 
feature of graphic imagery.
Keywords: Visual Perception, Pictorial Space, Psychology.
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ÖZET
RESİMSEL UZAM; PROJEKTİF VE KONSTRÜKTİVİST 
GRAFİK ALGI TEORİLERİNİN KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR
DEĞERLENDİRMESİ
Orhan Anafarta 
Grafik Tasarım Bölümü 
Yüksek Lisans
Tez Yöneticisi; Doç. Dr. Mahmut Mutman 
Haziran, 1996
Bu çalışmanın amacı, varolan grafik algı teorilerini anlaşılabilir 
kılmaya yönelik genel bir kuramsal çerçeve oluşturmaktır. Bu 
bağlamda, resimsel algı olayına iki temel yaklaşımı temsil eden 
'projektif' ve 'konstrüktivist' algı kuramları karşılaştırmalı 
olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Farklı kuramcıların bu iki paradigmayı 
değişen derecelerle benimsemeleri sebebiyle, çalışmada iki uç 
arasına dağılmış 4 farklı yaklaşım ele alınmaktadır. Karşılaştırma 
önemli bir grafik olgu olan 'resimsel uzam' üzerine 
temellendirilmiştir.
Anahtar SözcUkler: Görsel Algı, Resimsel Uzam, Psikoloji.
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CHAPTER 1
1-INTRODUCTION
1.1. Concept of 'Pictorial Image*
This is a thesis about humans’ visual perception and pictorial 
images. With regard to the wide variety of contexts within which it 
is used, the word 'image' does not seem to denote a common meaning 
across different domains and people. As the psychologist James 
Gibson remarks, it is quite possible to multiply the derived 
meanings of the word image such as: 'mirror image, retinal image, 
afterimage, mental image, conceptual image' and etc. As a 
consequence of this confusion, "we slide from one (meaning) to 
another without realising it when we talk about images" (1980, 
Foreword xv-xvii). To avoid such a semantic problem, Gibson’s basic 
formulation of the term is adopted throughout this study which 
constructs the definition of image as "an environmental source of 
optical stimulation, the cause of an optic array, but not the array 
itself." In this sense, "an image can be a solid model, sculpture, 
or statue, on the one hand; or a flat relief, picture, painting, 
drawing, or photograph on the other" (1966, 225).
As evident with regard to the above quotation, the notion of image 
that is dealt with in this study covers the objects that are made by 
human beings. According to historical records, humans are known to
have been constructing such 'artificial* images for at least fifteen 
thousand years (Gombrich 1986, 19), and the beginning of this 
activity marks the 'discovery of representation.' To quote Gibson 
again: "...men of a group called Cro-Magnon made a startling 
discovery... scratching, daubing and shaping began to be used for a 
new purpose - to make reliefs, pictures and sculptures..." (1966, 
224). This was what Gibson called "the structuring of light by 
artifice," that is, the act of altering the visual environment by 
building such 'displays' (1966, 224-49).
Transformation of the visual world, that is, constructing images has 
been possible in two major ways. It is imaginable to alter either 
'the surface layout' or 'the surface reflectance' of an object. 
While the former denotes the act of transforming a material in three 
dimensions such as making sculpture or relief, the latter involves 
drawing or painting on a two dimensional plain surface (Gibson 
1966, 228). At this point we reach a subdivision between two 
dominant tools of image making ncimely 'plastic' and 'graphic' acts. 
Though not being mutually exclusive ways of constructing imagery 
that can be separated by clearly defined boundaries, both tools 
possess certain peculiarities unique to them. Sowers, in order to 
extract such peculiar aspects of different visual media, brings 
forth the concept of the three primary 'modalities' of visual 
expression which are architectural, sculptural and pictorial 
(graphic) modalities (Sowers 1990, 10). Each modality can be 
distinguished from others not only by its visual dynamics but by the 
expressive task it is best equipped to perform. This model of 
categorising visual imagery takes the basic relation of an image
with the observer and environment as its variable of classification. 
Accordingly, the determining aspect of the pictorial modality is:
...its radical *self containedness.’ Although any such 
work may affect or be affected by its immediate 
surroundings, it bears no intrinsic relation to them. 
Visually, in the starkest diagrammatic terms, 'it 
always moves inward* two- or three-dimensionally - 
usually both... pictorial modality is almost ideally 
equipped to function as an instrument of pure 
envisagement (Sowers 1990, 11-12).
In contrast, sculptural modality moves 'outward* visually, as Langer 
declares, it "has a complement of empty space that it absolutely 
commands, that is given with it and only with it, and is, in fact, 
part of the sculptural volume" (qtd. in Sowers 1990, 12). In this 
sense, sculptural modality proves to be a tool of ordering the 
physical space with its basic aspect of outward growth and 
expansion. While the pictorial image acquires a place within the 
three dimensional space as a flat surface the empty volume is a 
legitimate element of sculptures (Arnheim 1954, 254). Finally, 
architectural modality is the extreme case of ordering space where 
the whole structure transcends our total visual apprehension. These 
three modal points of visual imagery form the points of a gradually 
structured scale on which each image stands in a definite place. 
Accordingly, it is quite possible that a particular image can embody 
certain properties of more than one modality. This can be seen in 
many instances where a certain sculpture acquires pictorial 
qualities or a picture commands space just as a solid sculpture 
does.
This study is mainly concerned with images possessing the most 
genuine aspects of the pictorial modality which are produced by the 
'graphic act,* that is, the activity of altering the surface
reflectance of a plane. Consequently, it is of necessity to extract
a rather clear definition of the term ’pictorial image’ with regard
to the above reviewed interpretations. By utilising Gibson's (1966,
224) formulation of image as a base of departure, pictorial image
can be defined as "a two dimensional plane whose surface reflectance
is altered and modified for the special purpose of being looked at."
This alteration of surface reflectance ranges from the simplest
linear tracing to manipulating different patches of color contrasts
on a two dimensional area. At this point, the scope of this study
delimits itself to flat reliefs, paintings, drawings, photographs
and any product of graphic design while excluding solid models,
sculptures and statues from the main argument. The physical (not to
mention 'the represented’) dimensions of the conveyed image proves
to be crucial as a determining factor in this issue. Pictorial
images are constrained within two dimensions in the sense that they
are constructed to be viewed perpendicularly in front (except some
extreme cases such as anamorphosis or trompe I’oeil) unlike the
sculptural images that can be observed from infinitely many
directions. Dondis illustrates the same point in his words:
The essence of sculpture is that it is constructed of 
solid materials and exists in three dimensions. Most 
other visual art forms -painting, drawing, graphics, 
photography, film- only suggest three dimensions by 
highly refined use of perspective and the light and 
shade of chiaroscuro. Our fingertips placed on a 
painting or photograph would supply no information 
about the physical formation of its subject matter...
( 1973, 150-51) .
1.2. Perceptual Psychology as a Tool of Analysing 
Pictorial Images
From the simplest acts of doodling to the most complicated pieces of 
pictorial art creating pictures has been an integral part of man's
life. If we inquire the basic and underlying reasons for the 
creation of many forms of pictorial image it is not possible to find 
coherent and immutable goals. The circumstances within which graphic 
production takes place are:
...many, sometimes clear and direct, sometimes 
multilateral and overlapping. The prime motivating 
factor is response to need, but the range of human 
needs covers an enormous area. They may be immediate 
and practical, having to do with the mundane matters of 
daily living, or they may be concerned with loftier 
needs for self-expression of a mood or an idea (Dondis 
1973, 146).
In this sense, the picture-viewer relationship proves to be quite a 
complicated issue with innumerable factors to be considered. An 
image can 'represent' objects or scenes, 'communicate' pieces of 
information or 'express' certain feelings. Accordingly, a 
successfully constructed perspective can stimulate the illusion of 
concrete reality, some abstract concepts can be expressed by pure 
shapes devoid of direct meaning, a poster prepared for a propaganda 
campaign may easily arouse powerful feelings of joy, anger or 
anxiety in viewers, or many international signs function properly 
without the need of recoursing to verbal language. The power of 
pictorial imagery is even more evident if one considers the recent 
advance of 'flowing digitised images' that have access to nearly 
everywhere through what Crary terms VDT's-video display terminals 
( 1984, 290). Present state with such a high degree of image 
consumption has neither been enduring since the discovery of 
representation nor emerged all of a sudden. Today's 'image polluted 
world' is actually an outcome of a long and fluctuating progression 
through which people 'searched' for different potentialities of 
pictorial images. The dominating paradigms of pictorial
representation has undergone tremendous transformations through 
history and ways of depiction changed corresponding to this track.
Till the beginnings of the modernist paradigm the above mentioned 
functions of pictorial imagery (communication, expression etc.) had 
been taken for granted without questioning how such things may 
'really' occur. This unconscious state had lasted until there 
emerged an awareness about the probable existence of some basic 
perceptual mechanisms that govern the functioning of pictures. This 
awareness marked the historical period where the 'science of 
psychology' became intertwined with the ongoing experimentation in 
the field of pictorial arts.
Throughout the epoch before the advance of modernism the varying 
properties of pictures had been readily accepted without being 
inquired in terms of any perceptual working mechanisms. As Gombrich 
states, explanations concerning these issues about pictorial 
representation were considered to be 'only problems of style and 
convention.' Different approaches to representing were thought to be 
rigidly connected to prevailing conventions of picturing and 
artists' personal styles without searching for any probable 
underlying perceptual and cognitive bases such different styles 
might stem from (1992, 24-29). The analysis of pictorial arts along 
with their criticism was in the responsibility of the 'art 
historian' whose actual task should rather have been to point out 
the emerging transformations in the prevailing paradigms of 
representation and to provide his readers with appropriate tools of 
historically categorising artwork in terms of their varying styles 
(Gombrich 1992, 19). It is quite a common fact that each period of
historical development has its own approach to depiction and a 
particular way of picture making is possible only in a corresponding 
'particular' period, not in any other one. For instance, an 
impressionist painting could have not been done in the seventeenth 
century. To categorise such different 'artistic styles' in relation 
to their formal properties is within the responsibility of the art 
historian; but who will unveil the hidden essence that drive people 
to paint in different manners through the history? The person that 
should carryout this job is certainly not the art historian. 
Perceptual psychology has been the appropriate field for such 
examination; but the merging of psychology with art analysis didn't 
occur till the beginnings of the nineteenth century.
The essential union between perceptual psychology and pictorial arts 
began to be established around 1840's along with the newly 
developing theories of vision and human physiology (Crary 1990, 
138) . The perceptual capabilities of human vision began to be 
investigated for the sake of discovering the basic physiological 
elements of seeing. The experimental studies of Helmholtz, Goethe, 
Schopenhauer and Brewster proved the fact that human sight didn't 
function like a photographic camera which obeyed the scientific 
rules of projective geometry. Instead, what we 'see' as the actual 
environment was quite different from what we really sense on our 
retinal plates. In this sense, the spectacle that we perceive as the 
outer world could be a 'construct' rather than a faithful pictorial 
correspondence. Moreover, Goethe, after his experiments concerning 
with the phenomenon of after-images, found out that human body was 
even capable of producing subjective visionary experiences, a 
discovery that shuddered the belief in the objective perception
(Crary 1990, 137-50). All these developments stimulated the 
emergence of the idea that ‘seeing’ was something much more 
complicated than as it had been imagined. There could be innumerable 
’inner’ as well as ’outer' factors that determined the way we 
perceive the physical environment. Consequently, the continuing 
scientific inquiry concentrated on extracting the basic elements of 
visual perception.
This new 'awareness' towards seeing found deep echoes in the realm 
of modernist graphic arts. Within the new historical paradigm, where 
the possibility of any objective correspondence of sight with 
environment is questioned with suspicion, the pictorial arts could 
no longer continue to search after the 'perspective realism’ being 
inherited from the Renaissance. A similar task of experimentation 
was being carried out in artistic studies which corresponded to the 
one continuing in the realm of psychology. As Gilmour points out, 
the whole system of visualisation was challenged - a challenge 
stimulated by the newly developing cosmology in science which 
destroyed our pre-existing conception of the 'real' (1986, 82). 
Krauss emphasises the newly established parallelism between 
perceptual psychology and pictorial arts as she illustrates 
Mondrian's story of appropriating the modernist style of depiction:
His entry into modernism took place on the site of the 
rationalisation of painting around the laws of color 
theory and physiological optics, at the point where 
composition and pictorial harmony were at last to be 
demystified by science and to find their grounding in a 
set of abstract theorems -theorems that bore the names 
of great physiologists and physicists like Fechner, 
Young, Helmholtz, Hering (1990, 11).
With the destruction of the established pictorial conventions 
embodying all the rules of perspective and geometrical space the
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modern artist began to search for the new possibilities of 
representing visionary experiences. Vision and visuality became the 
primary subject of pictorial art. Impressionism emerged with the 
artists' intention of depicting visionary phenomena 'as they are 
sensed on the retinal surface.’ Painters struggled to liberate 
representation from the conventionalist procedures of the past, a 
fact mostly evident in Ruskin’s desire of reaching the 'pure vision* 
by what he calls the "contemplative abstraction from the world" 
(Krauss 1990, 5). Many facts related to picture-viewer as well as 
picture-artist relationship that had been taken for granted up to 
that time became intricate puzzles to be solved. What was 
'realistic' depiction? Could there be transcendent rules of 
pictorial composition? or was it possible to express feelings in a 
pictorial display 'directly* without recoursing to conventional 
signs? (Gombrich 1992, 30). With the establishment of the 
essential correspondence between pictorial arts and perceptual 
psychology such questions came to be directed to both realms of 
application. While the scientific domain tried to reach at plausible 
theoretical constructions concerning these issues, artists concerned 
themselves with questioning these notions by visualising them.
As a historical consequence of the developing awareness related to 
the perceptual bases of pictorial effects, today, no argument about 
graphic and visual arts can totally be abstracted from issues 
related to psychology of seeing. Arnheim illustrates the close 
kinship between psychology and visual arts as:
All seeing is in the realm of psychologist, and no one 
has ever discussed the process of creating or 
experiencing art without talking psychology. Some art 
theorists use the findings of psychologists to 
advantage. Others apply them one-sidedly or without
admitting what they are doing; but inevitably they all 
use psychology^ some of it up-to-date, some of it home­
grown or left over from theories of the past ( 1954, 
3).
Rudolf Arnheim is one of the most eminent personalities in the field 
of art theory who uses the tools of ’gestalt' psychology in 
analysing visual artwork. Having written extremely influential 
treatises on pictorial arts as a psychologist, he symbolises the 
ultimate unification of psychology and art-criticism - two formerly 
distinct fields of study. There are also many other celebrated 
psychologists (Shepard, Kubovy, Gregory, Gardner etc.) who are quite 
productive in this area. Ernst Gombrich, on the other hand, uses the 
same tool -psychology- in illustrating certain issues related to 
visual arts while being an art historian himself. Like Gombrich, 
there are also many art historians and philosophers that refer to 
perceptual psychology as a scientific base in explaining certain 
issues. The significance of psychological knowledge even increases 
in the area of 'applied arts' such as graphic design or illustration 
where certain practical concerns related with the required functions 
of the outcome product is crucial. The designer refers to the 
findings of perceptual psychology in deciding about certain formal 
features of his prospective product. Myers illustrates the practical 
significance of possessing knowledge about perceptual mechanisms in 
the following words:
Understanding perception allows visual artists to 
express themselves in language that is clear, precise 
and effective. Whatever mode of expression visual 
artists choose, from photographic realism to totally 
abstract, non-objective works, understanding how 
perceptual processes work expands their capability to 
express their intentions more precisely - to clarify 
or, if they choose, to obscure meaning...(perceptual) 
knowledge provides artists with tools to exert a 
greater influence over a viewer’s emotional response to 
their work and over the precision with which visual 
communication takes place (1989, 5).
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1.3. statement of the Problem
The established directory of knowledge about psychology of human 
perception seems to be the most convenient source in interpreting 
the graphic-viewer relationship. However, a brief survey on 
different approaches and trends in psychology would reveal the fact 
that today's psychological science is quite far from providing the 
art analyst with a concrete data base to retrieve perfectly reliable 
information. In other words, contemporary psychology is full of 
divergent, even mutually exclusive approaches, each modelling the 
perceptual phenomena in fundamentally different ways. Moreover, the 
ongoing experiments continually declare new information which, in 
turn, results in the addition of a new approach to the mixed stream 
of diverse trends. Today, it is impossible to read anywhere a 
statement such as: "As it is ascertained by psychology that..." due 
to the indecisive nature of the field (Gombrich 1992, 38). The
most significant theoretical paradigms that dominate the field of 
perceptual psychology can briefly be named as. Empiricist, Gestalt, 
Behaviorist, Gibsonian, Information-Processing and Computational 
approaches all of which model human perception in a different manner 
(Matlin and Foley 1992, 6-8) . Though it is accepted that
psychology -science of the mind- should be adopted as a scientific 
guide in approaching to issues about perceiving pictures there is no 
consensual agreement on which model of human perception is the 
appropriate one.
As a logical consequence of such a divided scientific field, the 
dominant theories related to pictorial perception correspondingly 
differ among themselves. There are serious variations among the
treatises written on pictorial perception in terms of approach^ 
method and terminology (Gombrich 1992, 40). Theorists writing on 
this subject adopt different psychological models in dealing with 
issues related to picture-viewer relationship which leads the way to 
the formation of a diverse theoretical field full of mutually 
exclusive approaches and quite rigourous debates. As Hagen mentions: 
"It is not at all clear that continuation of the amnchair debate 
would end eventually in a consensual resolution of the critical 
questions about the nature of pictures and their perception** (1980, 
xxiv). Nevertheless, the high degree of fragmentation prevailing in 
the theoretical field does not create the essential problem this 
study intends to point out or resolve. To unify all the existing 
psychological approaches for the sake of reaching at a rigid theory 
of pictorial perception can not be a decisive, even plausible, 
solution for any possible problem. Such a proposal, while being 
technically impossible, means, as well, to deny the experimental and 
divergent nature of science.
The main problem this study considers as its point of departure is 
not the inconsistency in the theoretical field of graphic perception 
but the absence of an awareness in the art reader about these 
different approaches and the relative isolation the proponents of 
these opposing theories display in their works. Actually, the 
solution to the former problem would efface the negative effects of 
the latter by persuading the reader to apprehend the theoretical 
work he reads within a certain structural as well as historical 
framework.
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As mentioned earlier, theorists writing on pictorial perception 
adopt different psychological models in dealing with issues relating 
to picture-viewer relationship. While some of the authors inform the 
reader explicitly about the theoretical framework through which they 
approach their related issues, some treat their topics directly 
omitting such an important remark. Even, there are authors that 
treat psychology as a 'flexible reference book' from which every 
required information that is adaptable to various contexts can 
easily be derived regardless of the theoretical frameworks those 
pieces of information stem from. There are many books written on 
pictorial perception appropriating this eclectic style of writing.
1.4. Projective and Constructivist Approaches
Regarding these problems stated above, this study aims at 
constructing an 'overall theoretical outline* that would structure 
the existing approaches to graphic perception in a comprehensible 
whole. To form such a framework, two dominant theoretical paradigms 
that subsumes all these trends will be analysed in a comparative 
manner. Accordingly, all the diverse approaches to graphic 
perception seem to gather around two major opposing paradigms which 
are projective and constructivist positions. Simply defined, while 
the projectivists claim the natural relation between visual 
perception and pictorial images constructivists emphasise the 
artificial and conventional nature of this relationship. Hagen, by 
referring to the issues related to 'realistic depiction, illustrates 
the essential opposition of these theoretical paradigms as follows:
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Projective theorists argue that a picture succeeds as a 
representation of ordinary objects and scenes because 
it contains the same kind of information for 
determinate perception as is provided by the light 
reflected from ordinary environment. Thus^ the 
information carried by pictures is both necessary to 
determinate perception and sufficient without recourse 
to cultural convention or cognitive constructions. 
Quite the contrary, the radical constructivists claim 
that pictures succeed as representations of objects 
because they are constructed and read according to an 
arbitrary but shared code (1980, xxiv).
Rather than forming two mutually exclusive groups, these two 
approaches form the poles of a gradually structured theoretical 
arena where each theorist stands on one point along this scale 
ranging from radical projectivism to radical constructivism. Viewed 
through this framework, any theorist that studies on graphic 
perception can be considered either to be representing a radical 
deed or constructing a combined approach by adopting both of the 
paradigms in certain degrees. The basic working mechanisms 
underlying the significant functions of pictorial imagery such as 
representation of space, communication or expression are all 
explained in different terms by the proponents of these two 
approaches due to their distinct points of departure. While the 
constructivist position begins with the premise that our experiences 
with graphic displays are the products of human cognitive system 
which is conditioned by what we acquire by learning, projective 
theory constructs a rather unconstrained relation between the 
natural act of seeing and perceiving pictures (Best 1986, 75-93).
1.5. Pictorial Space as the Basis for Comparison
This study intends to construct a comparative account of the above 
mentioned contrasting theoretical positions while treating the
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concept of 'pictorial space' as a significant property of graphic 
imagery. Pictorial space, within the framework of this thesis, can 
be defined as the sense of three dimensional extension conveyed by 
an image belonging to pictorial modality. The reason for the 
selection of 'space' as the basis for comparison is that it is the 
unique domain in which visual theorists have produced the most 
characteristic arguments of their specific approaches. Other 
features of pictorial imagery, like communication or expression, do 
not allow for the same degree of illustrative comparison as 'space* 
does. Utilising this benefit, the following chapters will construct 
a systematic comparison of the projective versus constructivist 
approaches under the subject 'pictorial space.' The comparative 
limitations and advantages of the two approaches will be considered 
in terms of how they handle certain specific issues. Due to the 
gradated extent through which different theorists adopt either 
positions, four distinct approaches will be discussed extending from 
radical projectivism to radical constructivism. Every chapter will 
construct its frame around the claims and statements of one 
significant theorist who seems to lead the approach he supports.
This evaluative as well as comparative account of the two 
theoretical positions which determine the extremes of a divergent 
theory of graphic perception will construct a general perspective of 
the whole field of picture-viewer relationship. Forming such a broad 
framework of pictorial theories this study firstly aims at 
stimulating an awareness in the reader of art theory about the 
existence of such different approaches; being informed of these 
diverse trends existing in the field of pictorial perception he or 
she will avoid accepting one particular approach as the ultimate
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one. Moreover, by the utilisation of such a structured framework 
various written treatises on graphic perception can easily be 
perceived through their related categories while the inconsistencies 
existing within a particular work can be discerned with relative 
ease.
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CHAPTER 2
2. GIBSONIAN APPROACH: GRAPHIC SURFACE CONVEYING 
ENVIRONMENTAL INVARIANTS
This section analyses the most significant theoretical paradigm 
which is constructed around the arguments related to the supposed 
'natural' correspondence between the perception of environmental 
space and its pictorial representation. Among the various projective 
models of pictorial space, James Gibson’s 'direct theory* seems to 
be the most influential one elucidating a wide range of phenomena 
about picture-viewer relationship. Indeed, with his unique approach 
to visual perception, Gibson has transformed the basic assumptions 
of the projective model into a sophisticated visual theory which 
based its claims on rather a new idea of ' paralellism ' between 
pictorial and natural space awareness. Abandoning the conventional 
difference between sensation and cognition his theory proves to be 
quite far from being an average psychological account of perceiving 
two dimensional displays. Quite the contrary, it transcends the 
psychological boundaries and influences the fields of philosophy and 
art as well (Pick 1974, 7).
2.1. Extreme Projectivism
As mentioned in the introductory remarks of this study, this 
section, being the first subtitle of the chapter 'pictorial space,'
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is intended to portray the extreme projectivist approach concerning 
with issues related to the representation of space on two 
dimensional displays. Accordingly, Gibson and his many disciples 
argue that **a picture succeeds as a representation of ordinary 
objects and scenes because it contains the 'same kind of 
information’... as is provided by the light reflected from the 
ordinary environment. Such a correspondence between the 
environmental structure of light and the picture surface is accepted 
to be established in accordance with the rules of projective 
geometry which also governs the formation of retinal images (Hagen 
1980, xxiv). In this sense, pictorial space recognition proves to 
be immediate, and requires no intervening mental imagery or 
cognitive processing; because the same concrete cues are believed to 
function in the apprehension of both environmental and pictorial 
scenes (Millar 1994, 211).
2.2. Gibson's Information-Based Model of Pictorial
Space as Distinguished from the Sense-Based Models
Though he is usually included in the general projective theory of 
pictorial space perception, Gibson differs from the other projective 
theorists in an important respect. His model of visual perception is 
an 'information-based* one as distinguished from the 'sensation- 
based* approaches. While the latter emphasises the aspect of sense 
stimuli in pictorial perception, the former deals with 'direct 
experience’ excluding the physiology of senses from the main 
argument (Henle 1974, 48). Sense-based model of visual perception
historically precedes the information-based one and it provides the 
essential structure that a projective theory of pictorial vision
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should possess. However, due to its insufficiency in explaining 
certain perceptual and physiological issues related to picture- 
viewer relationship, sense-based model proves to be inadequate in 
particular contexts. Such an inadequacy has driven some theorists to 
construct an information-based model which disregards the problems 
of sense stimulation. Though both approaches share the essential 
belief in the projective correspondence of visible environment with 
human's perceptive system, information-based approach succesfully 
illustrates certain specific issues related with pictorial space 
without falling into the muddle of physiology. The following parts 
of this section analyses the essential claims of the sense-based 
projective model of pictorial space within its historical context 
conclusively concentrating on Gibson's information-based model which 
dominates the radical approach this section explores.
2.3. Historical Roots of the Sense-Based Projective 
Model: Leon Battista Alberti and Della Pittura
Projective model of the pictorial representation of space has a long 
and developmental history which has started with the publication of 
Della Pittura (On Painting) written by Leon Battista Alberti in 
1435. Presenting the art of painting as a kind of scientific 
activity based on mathematics and observation, Alberti is accepted 
to be the personality who stimulated the first historical momentum 
towards the modern era (Spencer 1976, 11)· Indeed, his treatise 
embodies many important propositions, yet unprecedented until that 
time, about human's acquisition of knowledge of the outer world. 
Alberti's philosophy, as summarised, suggests that:
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Knowledge comes first from ’sensory perceptions.* These 
perceptions are compared with each other and related to 
man to derive general conclusions. The conclusions are 
tested and made applicable by means of mathematics 
(Spencer 1976, 17).
As evident from the above quotation, Alberti adopts an ’empiricist* 
as well as a sense-based deed by claiming that all human can know 
about the world is acquired from sensory impressions. Also in 
accordance with the empiricist philosophy, 'comparisons' carried out 
on the information available through the sense organs (in this 
context, retinal field) guides the process of extracting reliable 
information from a rather limited source (Hochberg 1974, 20). Such
a notion of ’sense comparison’ is intended to illustrate the 
sufficiency of retinal images despite their limited capacity of 
scene duplication. Therefore, the internal coherence of the retinal 
image, which logically corresponds to the physical structure of the 
outer world, enables the observer to perceive his environment with 
exactitude. This is a strong proposal developed by empiricism 
against the intellectualist theory which asserts that a tiny retinal 
image, itself, can not account for our apprehension of the limitless 
real space. Surely, Alberti wasn’t accepted to be an empiricist at 
his time as such a concept wasn’t known yet. However, his theories 
implied a very important fact about human’s perceptual relation with 
the outer world: the ’direct’ correspondence of what we perceive 
with what really exists. Alberti applied the same philosophy to the 
'art of painting’ which is a medium used in conveying visual 
impressions. In this sense, a painted surface proved to be a 
substantial area so treated that it can simulate the retinal field 
of human eye in conveying reliable sense data recorded from the 
’visible’ environment.’ The enduring acceptance of this philosophy
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is evident in the contemporary psychologist Norman Haber's 
statements;
...geometry, color mixing, shadowing and induction 
processes (in pictorial representation) are all used to 
produce the same retinal patterns as that reflected 
from the three dimensional scene when viewed from the 
correct position (1980, 12).
In Alberti's philosophy depiction becomes a device of 'capturing' 
stable sense impressions from a selected portion, of the 
environmental vista. This is also known as the **picture-as-window 
assumption” illustrated in Alberti's words: "First of all about 
where I draw, I inscribe a quadrangle of right angles, as large as I 
wish, which is considered to be an open window through which I see 
what I want to paint” (1976, 56). The observable characteristics of 
the environment projects on Alberti's imaginary window enabling him 
to trace a pictorial correspondence of what he sees through it. The 
projection may differ in size depending on its end purposes and the 
placement of the imaginary window in relation the objects drawn. 
However, as the Albertian concept of internal coherence implies, 
this does not create a problem of misperception because the 
perceiving subject regards the 'relative' consistency of the drawn 
forms within a particular depiction rather than absolute magnitudes 
which, above all, can not be duplicated (1976, 52-55).
The underlying factor which renders the representation of a 
particular portion of the real space so 'natural' and 'realistic' 
regardless of its size is that it shares certain concrete rules with 
the ordinary act of perceiving space. Alberti determines the common 
base shared by ordinary and pictorial space perception as the 'laws 
of projective geometry.‘ Accordingly, pictorial surface and retina 
are isomorphic planes on which light rays being emitted from the
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environment form a projective correspondence of the real space. The 
artist, in constructing a correct projection of the outer 
environment can be said to imitate the related retinal image of the 
captured scene with utter accuracy. In this sense, perceiving space 
from a depiction does not essentially differ from perceiving the 
real space to the extent that a picture can fool the eye of the 
observer simulating the existence of concrete objects.
In accordance with his formulation of mathematics as 'the ultimate 
tool for translating natural phenomena applicable to practical 
situations', Alberti summarises all of his above stated assumptions 
to form the theory of "linear perspective." Based on reason and 
sensory data controlled by mathematics, linear perspective provides 
the artist with a means of creating apparent space in pictorial 
scenery. Spencer illustrates the underlying essence of Albertian 
perspecitve as:
In the monocular vision proposed by Alberti the visual 
rays extending from the eye to the object seen assume 
the form of a pyramid. A painting, in Albertian terms, 
should be an intersection of this pyramid equidistant 
to the plane seen and at an established distance from 
the eye. Given such an approach to vision and to work 
of art, geometry provides the only certainty for 
knowledge (1976, 21).
SURFACE
figure 1
2 2
Departing from this fundamental assumption, linear perspective is 
accepted to be the unique way of pictorially representing space as 
it can ordinarily be perceived. Due to its directly measurable 
correspondence with what it represents perspective is also utilised 
by professionals of certain technical areas as well as artists. 
According to Gill "(perspective representation) is very important in 
the work of architects, industrial designers and engineers making 
it possible to view the design as a finished product before 
committing it to manufacture" (1973, 7).
2.4. Problems of the Sense-based Model
The projective model of pictorial space representation considered 
upto here has been related with the most radical 'sensation based' 
descriptions claiming a one-to-one correspondence of what we 'sense' 
with what appears on the pictorial display. Although there is a 
consensual agreement among all the projective theorists regarding 
the 'naturalness' and 'directness' of perspective, it is not at all 
clear whether this is due to its replication of retinal images or 
some other perceptual fact. To determine the rules of projective 
geometry as a governing factor in both pictorial and natural space 
perception does not suffice to explain all the related phenomena 
about seeing the space in pictures.
The primary issue to be pointed out in this context is the fact that 
'central projection,' which forms the basis of perspective, is not 
the exact way our 'light sensitive plates' are stimulated by the 
visible scene. Kubovy deems perspective as a "geometric fiction" 
which is a mathematical tool of constructing space representations
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(1986, 20). It is, to be sure, not an arbitrary or culturally 
determined method of representing space; but to say that 
perspectivally constructed pictures are apprehended directly without 
recoursing to cognitive constructions does not imply that they mimic 
what appears on retinal surface of the human eye (Kubovy 1986, 
2 1 ) .
Radical sense-based theorists generally ignore the fact that retinal 
image is a projection on a concave surface rather than a flat one 
due to the spherical structure of the eye (Panofsky 1991, 31). In 
this sense, no flat canvas can exactly duplicate what goes on in the 
eye of the beholder. Moreover, humans view the world with two eyes 
(binocularly) whereas the theory of central projection bases all its 
claims on the existence of a single eye which does not move. Two 
important types of perceptual cue that can not be conveyed by a 
pictorial display are the information derived from binocular 
disparity and motion parallax (Rock 1975, 96). The only reality 
these two powerful tools of human visual system can extract from a 
picture is 'absolute flatness.' Another problematic consequence of 
the moving observer for the projective theory is the pictorial 
distortions caused by differing viewpoints. To the extent that 
perception of spatial relationships in pictures depends on exact 
isomorphism, we should expect that viewing a picture from an 
incorrect location would affect the perception of layout (Rosinski 
and Färber 1980, 138). Yet, ordinary experience clearly suggests 
that people can apprehend the depicted space in a picture easily 
even in extremely skewed viewing locations. How can a sense-based 
projective theory of pictorial space perception account for the fact 
that perceived spatial layout from a picture is 'not affected* due
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to any serious mismatch between the observer's viewing angle and 
picture's center of projection? A last thing to be pointed out 
against the sense-based explanations is that outline drawn 
caricatures, in many instances, represent the intended scenery or 
object even more accurately than projectively correct drawn 
perspectives or photographs (Rock 1984, 102); and this proves the
fact that linear perspective is not the only prerequisite to 
represent space pictorially.
2.5. Gibsonian Theory of Vision: The 'Visual
Information* Available for the Moving Observer
The problems of the sense-based model stimulated the formulation of 
a new approach which could account for all the above stated 
pictorial phenomena, because the physiology of the eye, itself, was 
an insufficient tool to elucidate the working mechanisms of 
pictorial perception. While it was accepted that the relation of 
retinal images to visible environment was based on projective 
correspondences, the mere physical characteristics of the retinal 
image did not reveal anything significant about how we perceive 
spatial layout from pictures. Moreover, it was, within itself, a 
problem to separate sensation from perception, namely the retinal 
image from the final percept, as this raised the ceaseless questions 
related with how we transform retinal pictures to well comprehended 
scenery.
Gibson believed that it was worthless to analyse the structure of 
retinal images, as human's relation to the visible environment was 
too complicated to be elucidated by merely considering static
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projections. It was the 'phenomenal world' as it is experienced by 
an 'active' observer that a theory of spatial perception should 
account for (Gibson 1966, 253). Gibson's emphasis on the 'visual 
experience’ is evident in his well-known distinction between 'visual 
field' and 'visual world.' Accordingly, the visual field is the 
retinal image itself which is formed by moving and transforming 
patterns of stimulus correlates whereas the 'visual world is the 
stable environment that we consistently perceive. The stimuli that 
appears as the visual field is just an input which, itself, can not 
be considered to be the ultimate percept. In this sense, the 
'unbounded and perfectly stable' visual world is:
... the familiar ordinary scene of daily life, in which 
solid objects look solid, square objects look square, 
horizontal surfaces look horizontal, and the book 
across the room looks as big as the book lying in front 
of you (Gibson 1950, 26).
Unless the visual theorist considers the 'visual world' as the basis 
of our spatial perception while continuing to believe in the sense- 
percept dichotomy he or she accepts to cope with the question of 
'how a flat image can be converted to a three dimensional space 
apprehension’ along with other such questions about pictorial space 
mentioned in the context of sense-based explanations.
Gibsonian model of 'direct perception' is essentially based on the 
idea of 'visual information' that is available to a 'moving 
observer.' Unlike the traditional theories which deem 'the static 
retinal image' as the unique material utilised in 'inferring' the 
spatial structure of environment, Gibson's theory relinquishes the 
notion of retinal image altogether from the argument. Accordingly, 
perception does not begin with a flat picture but with a general
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structure and behavior of light patterns that we directly experience 
as a function of our 'moving body’ (Gibson 1986^ 149). The 
activity of perceiving the structure of the environmental space is 
named by Gibson as the process of 'information pickup' that involves 
the exploratory performances of looking around, getting around and 
glancing at things (1986, 147). These performances form a 
continuously changing optical energy flow through the eye which 
contains highly structured information about a rigid spatial 
environment. The information about space inherent in this optical 
flow is given in a continuous projective transfoimation appearing at 
the retinal area (Johansson 1974, 136). The 'consistencies* that 
are picked from this ever-changing structure of the sensed pattern 
enables the observer to perceive the 'constant' environment that do 
not transform in itself. In this sense, not the sensory bits of 
stimulation but the above mentioned consistencies can be considered 
as the basic elements of spatial perception.
2.6. Environmental Invariants
Picking up the consistencies from the transforming visual field 
underlies the Gibsonian theory of 'invariance detection.* 
Accordingly, the movements of the observing subject causes the 
formation of a continually transforming projective stimulus pattern. 
However, this transformation is not something totally chaotic; the 
underlying logic of projective correspondence gives the transforming 
optical pattern a basic structure that does not change - which, in 
Gibsonian terms, remains invariant (Gibson 1982, 156). The 
perceiver, by moving throughout the visible environment becomes
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aware of this unchanging structure and adopts it as his reference to 
detect ’variance.' As Gibson, himself, declares:
The perceiver extracts the invariants of structure from 
the flux of stimulation while still noticing the flux. 
For the visual system in particular, he tunes in on the 
invariant structure of the ambient optic array that 
underlies the changing perspective structure caused by 
his movements (1986, 247).
At this point, the Gibsonian concept of 'stimulation' should be 
clarified as it essentially differs from the other commonly known 
psychological definitions. Accordingly, retinal stimulation denotes 
"a simultaneous variation over the set of receptors,... and the 
order of such a variation" (Gibson 1950, 63). Departing from this 
definition, Gibson extends the common meaning of the retinal 
stimulus to the term "ordinal stimulation" which simply refers to 
succession or order. Rather than being a passive sensitive plate 
that embodies a number of detached stimulus points, retinal surface 
(visual field) is a neural interface area on the surface of which a 
gradually ordered and transforming pattern of visual impressions 
resides. The order and general coherence of the visual field which 
is refined by the projective correspondences caused by a moving body 
enables the perceiver to distinguish between the varying and 
invarying patterns of stimulation. As mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, the persisting patterns of stimuli - the invariants form 
a transcendent guide to determine what really varies in the field of 
view; and these invariants remain similar for all the alike species. 
Gibsonian theory of direct perception also asserts that the 
capturing of the environmental invariants is not the product of a 
sophisticated cognitive process; quite the contrary every animal 
that moves through the differentially structured environment can
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'directly' perceive them as the function of their bodily movements 
(Best 1986, 95).
One of the higher order invariants that the perceiver picks from the 
visible environment is the gradient of texture which is something 
displayed by all the 'surfaces* of the world we live in (Best 1986^ 
92). Despite the changing properties of the perceived space due to 
the movement of the observer, the fact that it displays a gradient 
of texture all over its surfaces remain invariant. The perceiver 
judges about the general layout of the space which is populated with 
differently slanted and structured surfaces by considering the 
texture gradient all these surfaces display in a coherent manner. 
Accordingly, the ground texture of the visible world gradually 
diminishes towards the horizon and it creates a framework of size 
for the objects that stand on it (Gibson 1986, 162). This is also 
known as the 'ground theory' of space perception which asserts that 
there can be no space perception unless the perceiver is provided 
with a continuous background surface. The invariant relations of all 
surfaces to the ground and to one another determine the layout of 
space for the moving perceiver (Gibson 1986, 148).
The essential structure of the perceived counter-movement of the 
ground texture as a function of the observer's movements is another 
essential invariant. Accordingly, the whole visual pattern expands 
in an ordered way (from the vanishing point) as the viewer 
approaches the scene whereas it contracts as he recedes from it 
(Best 1986, 92). The relative movements and projective 
deformations of the physical objects clearly reveal their unchanging 
structure. 'Horizon' is another non changing quality of the visible
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environment which never moves regardless of the differing kinds of
motion the observer performs.
2.7. Graphic Surface Conveying Environmental Invariants
Gibson's theory of pictorial space perception derives from his claim 
that a picture can represent the space correctly to the extend that 
it conveys the similar invariants as extracted from the real 
environment (Sedgwick 1980, 48). Such an approach assumes that
some of the invariants of an array can be separated from its 
perspective structure, not only when the perspective keeps changing, 
as in life, but also when it is arrested, as in a still picture. 
Ordinarily, such invariants emerge as a function of bodily movement 
but for Gibson they can also be distinguished in the limiting case 
of an unchanging structure. In this sense, the perception of space 
from pictorial displays prove to be also 'direct' because it 
preserves the essential factor that an observer relies on when 
perceiving the real space; the invariants.
One such powerful invariant that can be directly conveyed by a 
pictorial display is 'texture gradient.' Corresponding to the basic 
information pickup mechanism of the visual system, the gradient of 
texture is the major source of information about the 'slope' of a 
plane in pictorial displays. Accordingly, the direction of the 
gradient would indicate which way the surface recedes from the 
observer, the steepness of the gradient would indicate the extent to 
which the surface is sloped away from the frontal plane and changes 
in the gradient would indicate changes in slope angle (Rock 1975, 
90). In figure 2 an abrupt transition in the gradient (right)
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conveys the information about the presence of two planes one 
occluding the other whereas a change in the gradient amount (left) 
gives the information of two planes joined to each other forming an
edge.
Gibson argues that gradient of texture as the basis of all spatial 
perception is a general phenomenon of which linear perspective is 
only a special case and it can directly be conveyed in pictures 
(Gibson 1950, 70). Also the presence of a non changing horizon 
through which the texture gradient diminishes to zero is another 
environmental invariant which can be preserved in two dimensions. 
Similar to the ordinary act of perceiving, the texture gradient of 
the depicted ground surface forms a general framework through which 
every object acquires a definite size and shape in relation to the 
cimount of texture it occupies (Gibson 1986, 163). Consequently, 
the background of a successfully rendered volumetric scene is 
neither open to the sky nor is it undefined; rather it is made up of
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substantial walls and surfaces that provide the gradient of texture 
that the observer needs in apprehending the virtual space (Forseth 
1991, 91).
Gibsonian theory considered up to here was more or less in 
correspondence with Alberti's picture as window assumption; because, 
Albertian perspective, though unconsciously, confirms the presence 
of texture gradients and the invariant horizon within the projective 
model. However, the correct representation of space does not 
essentially require the determination of a fixed viewpoint along 
with faithfully depicted texture gradients. In Gibsonian model there 
is an essential difference between the 'photographic' and 
'chirographic' methods of representing space; whereas the former 
involve a camera the latter involve graphic tools of some sort for 
the hand-eye system (Gibson 1986, 272). In this context, pictorial 
representations drawn in 'chirographic method' consist of mere 
outlines rather than scales of grey or color. The unique property of 
the photographic methods with faithfully depicted perspective 
renderings is that they put the observer 'in the scene' by assigning 
him a specific vantage point. But this do not make them preferable
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to rather freely drawn outline pictures which can also represent 
space perfectly (Kennedy 1974, 214). The most problematic issue 
that the traditional sense-based theories couldn’t cope with was the 
fact that simple outline drawings had the ability to represent space 
even though they did not replicate the retinal images of the related 
scenes.
What the outline drawings consist of are not 'pictorial' forms that 
should be related with the real scene by a cognitive activity or a 
one-to-one projective correspondence. Gibson deems the outline forms 
as 'pictorial invariants' that correspond to the environmental 
invariants revealed by motion in the real space (Sedgwick 1980, 
64). Sedgwick illustrates this phenomenon clearly in the following 
words:
. . . because the optic array at any moment of direct 
perception is always in the process of revealing 
invariants through change, the optic array from a 
pictorial representation can be taken as an arrested 
optic array frozen in the process of revealing its 
invariants... in other words, pictorial invariants are 
structures in the static optic array from a picture 
that would remain invariant if the optic array were 
from a real scene and were being transformed by a 
movement of the observer (1980, 65).
Accordingly, if the figure of a cat can easily be recognised in an 
outline form, this implies that the drawn figure preserves the 
essential invariant features of the 'cat as a physical object' seen 
through movement: it displays a specific optical discontinuity with 
the ground surface regardless of the dynamically differing 
viewpoints from which it is viewed. In this sense, outline drawn 
figures are not forms that correspond to physical objects, but they 
are 'formless' invariants. By constructing such a model of pictorial
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space perception, Gibson seems to imply that 'what we draw is what 
we really see*;
. . .when the young child sees the family cat at play, 
the front view, side view, rear view, top view and so 
on are not seen, and what gets perceived is the 
Invariant cat... Hence, when the child first sees a 
picture of a cat he is prepared to pick up the 
invariants and he pays no attention to the frozen 
perspective (1986, 271-72).
Similarly, a perceiver never sees a human figure as a flat patchwork 
or as a cut-out like a paper doll, but probably sees a sort of head- 
body-arms-legs invariant. Any outline drawing which preserves this 
invariant property can be recognised as a human and the outlines 
tend to be seen as the occluding edges of a human figure with 
interchangeable near and far sides. Viewed from this point, an 
'outline' represents a discontinuity in the environmental texture, 
and when it is presented as a closed pictorial form it conveys an 
invariant feature of what it represents when viewed in motion. For 
instance, a door is always seen as a rectangle from wherever it is 
observed implying the fact that rectangularity is an invariant 
property of doors. Then, a rectangle in an outline drawn picture can 
represent a door if it is supported with other similar invariants 
within a coherent frcimework.
As the above statements imply, the information in a line drawing is 
carried by 'connections' of the lines, not by lines as such. In 
other words, the invariants are found in the ways that the lines 
are, in Gibsonian terms, 'nested,' not in the forms of these areas. 
This brings a limitation to the environmental information that can 
be captured in a line drawing. Gibson enumerates some of the 
environmental invariants that can be represented in outlines as: ”a 
corner, an edge, an occluding edge, a wire, a crack and the horizon
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line” (1986, 287 ). For instance, a physical edge remains to be an 
edge invariantly from whichever viewpoint it is observed and this 
invariant property can be given in an outline picture within a 
coherent net of line segments. In figure 4 Kennedy points to a 
number of line segments that depict environmental features that 
remain invariant when observed in motion (1974, 214).
Gibsonian theory just considered can easily cope with many questions 
about pictorial space perception that can not be answered by a 
sense-based approach. The core of the information pickup theory of 
Gibson is based on the assertion that both the real and pictorial 
space perception depend on the capturing of invariants which are 
'formless.' Then, the fact that space can be perceived from freely 
drawn outline pictures do not constitute a puzzle as they can also 
preserve the essential invariants of the environmental space if they 
are correct drawings (an outline picture can be drawn intentionally 
to give false or contradictory information).
The model of invariant detection also answers the question raised by 
the phenomenon of unchanging percept of the depicted layout despite 
the observer's changing viewpoints. Accordingly, the internal 
coherence of the drawn figures remain invariant and convey the
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intended scenery if the observer is 'aware of the surface* on which 
the scene is depicted. A correct apprehension of the represented 
space requires that the observer can perfectly discern the spatial 
layout of the picture surface. Wollheim emphasises the same point 
when he asserts that the observer should firstly become aware of the 
surface he looks at and then he can discern what is represented 
(1991/ 105). In this sense, though the perception of the depicted
layout do not require special learning, awareness of the picture 
surface is something that is adapted.
2.8. Gibson and Merleau Ponty
With regard to its reviewed portion up to here, Gibson's perceptual 
theory resembles Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological account of how we 
experience our visible environment. The first essential point that 
links the approaches of these two theorists is that both accept the 
irrelevance of sense stimuli in human’s perceptual relation with the 
world. In a similar way with Gibson,
Merleau-Ponty objects to all such mechanistic 
explanations of perceptual experience on the grounds 
that they represent 'blind processes’ which take place 
in such a way that 'nobody sees,' processes in which, 
in leaving the perceiver out of account, prove 
incapable of accounting for the richness and variety of 
an experience invested with emotional as well as 
sensory qualities... (Macann 1993, 166).
For both Gibson and Merleau-Ponty, what we 'directly* experience as
a function of our moving body constitutes the essential source of
information required for the perception of space. The Gibsonian
notion of 'invariants’ is also clearly discernible in Merleau-
Ponty 's account of 'horizon* as an unchanging element of the
perceived environment. He held that 'horizon* remains a constant
element in the visible world, even as we move toward it:
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Although the visual contour shifts when I walk toward 
the hills or toward the shoreline, it is only the 
visual content which changes, not the structure between 
me and the horizon... While the horizon is one 
’invariant' of perception, so is my occupation of a 
visible place in looking toward it (qtd. in Gilmour 
1986, 99).
The concept of the 'stimulation gradient* which denotes a 'field' 
with an internally coherent structure constitutes Merleau-Ponty's 
essential attitude to pictorial representation as well as language. 
A child learns how to use and understand language as he discerns the 
internal structure of the formerly meaningless groups of sound. 
After a certain period of active involvement and experience he 
begins to capture the varying and invarying patterns of information 
that exists in the endless speeches of people (Ponty 1964, 40-41). 
Evidently, meaning is not something attached to the 'form' which do 
not even exist for both Gibson and Merleau-Ponty. Similarly, in a 
pictorial representation, the internal relations of the drawn 
elements (the nesting of lines) create the overall effect of the 
depiction which in turn corresponds to environmental invariants 
(Gibson 1986, 288). The gradients of color as well as texture 
determine the discontinuities and irregularities in the whole 
pattern from which the observer extracts invarying figures and the 
general layout of the depicted volume.
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CHAPTER 3
3. GESTALT APPROACH: ARNHEIM AND THE LAW OF SIMPLICITY
As illustrated in the preceding section, Gibson's approach to all 
issues related to visual perception is a 'phenomenological* one 
which completely disregards the physiological structure of the 
perceptual system as being irrelevant to the 'direct experience* of 
apprehending the visible world. Accordingly, perception of pictorial 
as well as real space is 'direct' and 'unmediated' that does not 
require any intermediary neural representations or further 
processing. Such an approach easily explains all the perceptual 
issues related to picture-viewer relationship merely considering the 
general rules of projective geometry and without dealing with 
intricate and rather unclear mechanisms of human physiology and 
neural structure. Actually, this is the major advantage of the 
Gibsonian approach over the 'sense-based' models all of which tried 
to formulate pictorial space as a consequence of a faithful retinal 
image duplication. However, Gibson's direct approach prove 
insufficient in explaining certain perceptual phenomena which has 
stimulated the formulation of different models of pictorial seeing.
3.1. Limitations of the Gibsonian Model
Shepard explicitly states the questions that Gibson and his 
followers left unanswered as:
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In what form is the relevant information contained in 
the pattern of light available from a mobile observer's 
viewpoint? By what neural processes does the visual 
system extract this information from this pattern? And^ 
most pertinently^ what does happen under poorly 
illuminated, partially obstructed, interrupted or in 
some way constrained unnatural conditions of viewing? 
(1990, 189).
These questions are the consequences of a number of perceptual 
phenomena which proved the naivete of Gibson's model. The existence 
of certain 'constructive' processes of the perceptive system can be 
discerned when observers are faced with illusory or tricky visual 
situations. Such pictorial illusions including reversible figures, 
impossible objects and other alike aberrant instances of depiction 
are quite common tools of experimental psychology used in 
elucidating the hidden working mechanisms of humans' perceptual 
system. Gibson generally avoided dealing with these data by claiming 
the unnatural and 'ecologically invalid' conditions in which these 
displays are presented to subjects. However, the facts revealed by 
these experiments can not be overlooked as they are quite 
illustrative about humans' physiology of pictorial as well as 
natural seeing.
3.2. An Evidence for the Constructive Operations 
of the Perceptual System: Amodal Completion
One of the most significant phenomena revealing the 'constructive' 
role of the perceiver is 'amodal completion' which is the act of 
perceptually completing the hidden or occluded parts of objects 
(Kanizsa & Gerbino 1982, 170).
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figure 5
Looking at the overlapped configuration represented as figure 5 
every human being shares the same spatial impression related to *a* 
and ’b.' The common percept is that ’a ’ is a rectangle partly 
occluded by the other rectangular surface ’b ’ which lies on top of 
it. Though the line configuration in the figure is 'ecologically 
invalid' and represents no explicit information about the above 
mentioned facts, any observer directly reaches at this spatial and 
formal interpretation without even thinking (Kanizsa & Gerbino 
1982, 169). The phenomenon of directly apprehending outline
configurations was also explained by Gibson as invariance detection; 
but the same theory proves inadequate in elucidating how 'a' can be 
perceived as a perfect rectangle while it is only partly projected. 
Similarly, when looking at ambiguous outline drawings observers 
generally accept one definite spatial reading among infinite 
possible layouts while 'amodally' completing the perceived 'hidden' 
shapes. Where does the information related to hidden objects that do 
not exist in the drawing come from?
3.3. Gestalt Theory of Spatial Perception
Amodal completion is only one of innumerable phenomena forcing the 
visual theorists to think about a perceptual mechanism which carries
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out certain 'constructive' operations to transform the projected 
retinal patterns into properly perceived layouts of space. Gestalt 
theory is the outcome of such a drive which supports the idea of a 
'mediated' process of perception consisting of a two-step perceptual 
activity. Accordingly^ the outer world is projected on a sensitive 
neural surface which is then subjected to a kind of organisation 
process that produced the final percept (Beck 1982, 1). In 
contrast to the Gibsonian view of human's direct perceptual relation 
to the environment through bodily movements, Gestalt theory deems 
space as a 'construct' of the human neurophysiology. Against 
Gibson's assertions related to the existence of orderly structures 
'in the world' being revealed by motion, perceiver is accepted to be 
responsible in attributing order to the two dimensional 'raw' 
stimuli according to Gestalt model (Gibson E. 1982, 160). 
Consequently, Gestalt can be interpreted as a 'form' oriented 
approach based on the accepted primacy of flat monocular pictures in 
perceiving space.
With regard to the above reviewed material. Gestalt seems to 
represent a constructivist approach to spatial perception. However, 
its physiological model of perceiver-environment relationship claims 
the opposite. Gestalt builds an 'analog model' of perceptual 
correspondence between space and human’s neural structure in 
contrast to the 'symbolic' models of radically constructivist 
approaches (Attneave 1982, 13). Such correspondence between the 
outer and the inner world is also known as 'isomorphism' a term used 
to define the fact where the outer stimuli and its internal 
representation have similar structures (Arnheim 1987a, 210).
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Wolfgang Köhler^ one of the founders of Gestalt school/ illustrates 
the Gestaltian concept of isomorphism as:
The principle of isomorphism demands that in a given 
case the organisation of experience and the underlying 
physiological facts have the same structure...Thus we 
assume that when the visual field exhibits a thing as a 
detached entity, the corresponding process in the brain 
is relatively segregated from surrounding processes 
(1947, 344).
Accordingly, the projecting light pattern forms an 
’analog’(isomorphic) correspondence of itself on the optic neural 
area which is then subjected to processes of organization determined 
by the ’physiological functions’ of human cortex. The Gestaltian 
construction of space within the perceptual system is not guided by 
any ’cognitively oriented’ constraints, as it is the case in the 
constructivist models of perception, but it is a natural consequence 
of the behavior of cortical structure. Beck defines the perceptual 
activity proposed by Gestalt as ’nonsymbolic self-regulating analog 
physical processes” (1982, 1).
The idea of a ’mediated’ and ’two-step’ process gives the first 
impression as if Gestalt theory exhibits a constructivist approach. 
However, the principle of isomorphism supported with the built-in 
organisational activities of human's optical cortex reveal that 
perception of space depends on organising projective correspondences 
and it is an innate ability found in every human being (Rock 1975, 
273). In this sense. Gestalt theory of perception should be regarded 
to present a projective model though being less radical than the 
Gibsonian one.
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3.4. Gestalt Theory of Pictorial Space
As already mentioned, Gestalt theory sees the process of spatial 
perception as essentially based on the two dimensional retinal 
pictures. In contrast to the Gibsonian notion of ’extracted 
invariants' that are formless, Gestalt model of space perception 
begins with the accepted primacy of 'retinal forms.' Accordingly, 
the genuine information that determines the perceived space derives 
from the fundamental operations of organisation carried out on the 
projected 2-d retinal patterns to which binocular interaction and 
movement information are only 'added' (Zanforlin 1982, 254). So,
the ordinary act of seeing is essentially based on the 'pictorial* 
characteristics of the visual field: what we actually see is a 
'projectively constructed picture' of the outer world which is, in 
turn, subjected to various processes of organisation to form an 
internally coherent apprehension of space. In this sense, the 
pictorial theory of Gestalt does not basically differ from its 
general perceptual model as both operate on similar premises related 
to stimulus patterns and physiological processes. Identical to the 
perceptual activity that occurs in any illuminated part of the 
physical environment, how a certain configuration of lines or shapes 
is perceived depends on the corresponding (isomorphic) neural 
activity it excites on the related cortex area. Various pictorial 
phenomena relevant to pictorial space apprehension including figure- 
ground relationship, overlapping, transparency and linear 
perspective are modelled by Gestalt theory as outcomes of different 
analog patterns of excitation and arousal.
43
what are known as 'Gestalt laws of construction/organisation* derive 
from the accepted parallelism between intricately observed phenomena 
and their corresponding neurological mechanisms. As Koffka declares: 
"For the Gestalt psychologist, phenomenological description is 
fundamental because, according to isomorphic hypothesis, the 
phenomenological datum reflects the neural processes underlying 
perception" (qtd. in Metelli 1982, 220). Following the same line 
of thought, Arnheim attributes the direct effects of pictorial 
displays, such as balance, tension, depth etc, to similar activities 
going on throughout the optical cortex area in the sense that a 
corresponding disturbance of neural balance arises in an observer's 
brain if he or she confronts with an unbalanced graphic composition. 
The possibilities of adaptation and cultural factors are altogether 
rejected as being only weak factors that can not seriously influence 
the innate functioning mechanisms (physiological laws) of the human 
brain (Arnheim 1987b, 306). Any human being is affected by a 
graphic configuration in the same way as physiology of neural 
structure is something permanent among cultures and races. Departing 
from these premises. Gestalt theory constructs a body of 'pictorial 
laws' that determine how certain two dimensional configurations are 
apprehended by viewers.
3.5. The Notion of 'Wholes’
The fundamental statement of Gestalt is that our perception of a 
graphic configuration does not depend on isolated apprehension of 
separate shapes or forms occupying the picture plane/retinal field, 
but it works by relating parts with the entire configuration. In 
Arnheim's words: "Seeing something involves assigning it a place in
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the whole: a location of space, a score on the scale of size or 
brightness or distance" (1954, 11). Accordingly, the observer 
reacts to the 'pattern' of pictorial stimuli to which he or she is 
exposed; and this points to a 'unitary process' which denotes the 
experience of 'a sensory field' rather than a mosaic of local 
sensations (Köhler 1947, 103). This is a logical consequence of 
the primary claim of Gestalt which represents the optic neural area 
as a 'field' isomorphic to the picture surface. To quote Arnheim 
again :
...to see means to see in relation... the decisive phase 
of visual processing takes place at a level of the 
nervous system which, whatever its precise 
physiological nature, must function as a ''field,*' that 
is, it must allow free interaction among the forces 
generated and mobilized by the situation (1969, 73).
In pictorial perception the contextual structure of the entire 
visual/pictorial field determines the phenomenal effects of its 
subparts. Sometimes the contextual influence of the 'whole' pattern 
is so strong in a pictorial configuration that it even 'genuinely* 
distorts its secondary elements.
In figure 6 the left half of the rectangle phenomenally shrinks 
being affected by the two legs of the narrow angle drawn in 
outlines. Such a distortion wouldn't have been experienced if the
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square were presented as a single figure, as it wouldn't have shared 
the whole visual field with another pictorial element. This 
phenomenon, along with innumerable similar pictorial illusions, are 
explained by the 'dynamic* field theory of Gestalt psychology 
(Arnheim 1954, 10). Accordingly, the neural area responsible in 
organising the visual field transforms the structure of the each 
projected element in accordance to its spatial relationship with the 
other elements.
3.6. The Law of Simplicity
The essential law of Gestalt in accordance to which the graphic 
field acquires its phenomenal effect is the 'psychophysical tendency 
towards balance.' All the drawn elements of a pictorial image 
project on the observer's 'neural canvas' forming isomorphic traces 
of excitation. The structural properties of the neural field sets 
out to construct a 'balanced' interpretation of the graphic pattern 
for the sake of reducing the neural tension caused by the picture’s 
essentially imbalanced and complex retinal correlate. Neural balance 
requires that the final interpretation of the seen image should be 
as 'simple' as possible and this inscribes the basic law of Gestalt 
responsible for the phenomenon of pictorial space. 'Simplicity' is 
the main target of the perceptual system in accordance to which it 
extracts the apprehension of a spatial volume from a two dimensional 
configuration of lines and shapes. Arnheim illustrates this basic 
tendency of the perceptual system as: "Any stimulus pattern tends to 
be seen in such a way that the resulting structure is as 'simple* as 
the given conditions permit" (1954, 53). The emergence of a 
'simple' structure of 3-d space in the neural medium of an observer
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means that all the potential energies previously excited by the 
complexities of the visual field reaches a minimum level settling 
down for a balanced state. Perkins illustrates the same process in 
his 'relaxation model' claiming that the perceptual/physical system 
will tend to relax toward a minimum energy state which satisfies the 
projective constraints (1982, 87). In this sense, what the observer 
ultimately perceives as a thoroughly defined representation of space 
is the 'simplest possible interpretation' of an essentially complex 
retinal projection. The system prefers to perceive a 'simple* 
spatial structure that extends towards three dimensions rather than 
a flat and irregular patchwork of projected shapes. The law of 
simplicity is also known as 'the law of pragnanz,** a term invented 
by the German founders of the gestalt psychology Kurt Koffka, Hans 
Wertheimer and Wolfgang Köhler (Rock 1975, 270).
At this point, the criteria of such an 'objective* simplicity 
requires explanation. For Arnheim, the essential factor that 
determines the simplicity-complexity of a given graphic 
configuration is the number of "structural features" it embodies. 
These structural features, as far as a 2-d shape is concerned, are 
the aspects of 'distance' and 'angle' the increasing number of which 
enhance the complexity of the image (Arnheim 1954, 57). 
Accordingly, the three dimensional form of a wireframe cube is much 
simpler than its two dimensional projection as the former can be 
described by two main structural features: an angle (90**) and a 
fixed distance line. Consequently, when confronted with the 
projection of such a cube the perceptual systems favors a 'simple* 
three dimensional interpretation rather than accepting a complicated 
2-d pattern with many angles and distances.
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The projected pattern in figure 7 is directly apprehended as a 
wireframe cube residing in three dimensions. The 3-d mental 
construction of the drawing occurs in such a simultaneity that no 
one even discerns ’what really exists there:' a flat configuration 
of lines in various lengths that are skewedly nested together.
Attneave, building his 'soap bubble' model^, has formulated the 
'simple' features of layout that are favored by the perceptual 
system in extracting spatial meanings from pictures. Accordingly, 
equality of length, coplanarity, parellism, collinearity, inclusion, 
connectednes and right-angledness are the most dominant features of 
'simplicity' that are continually attributed to the observed 2-d 
configuration as much as the constraints of the projection permits 
(Attneave 1982, 14-20). In other words, perceived projective 
distortions call for a recovery of the projected retinal image if 
these distortions can be interpreted as deviations from a more
 ^Allncavc has used this icrm being inspired by die fact lliat a real soap bubble covers a fixed volume by using the 'minimum* and most simple surface area. He has, in this sense, emphasised the inherent similarity between Uic brain's and a soap bubble’s strategy of spatial organization.
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’stable* and ’simple’ 3-d form (Arnheim 1969, 51). In the example 
illustrated as figure 7 the variously angled line joints are 
perceived as projective deviations from 90* degrees. Attneave has 
also hypothesised the existence of a * three-dimensional neural 
manifold" which functioned as a three dimensional sketch pad used in 
constructing the ’simple’ representations of the confronted 
pictorial projections (1982, 14).
3.7. Gestalt Principles of Pictorial Space Construction
The fundamental claims of the Gestalt approach to pictorial space 
has been briefly summarised upto here. The following part 
concentrates on a number of pictorial phenomena that emerge as 
functions of humans' physiological tendency to 'see* space in 2-d 
graphic configurations.
Modelling the phenomenon of pictorial space perception in 
•psychophysical' terms Gestalt theory embodies the implication that 
humans have an innate tendency to 'impose' spatial interpretations 
to even obviously flat surfaces. As Arnheim emphasises, the act of 
spatial apprehension is so inherent in human’s perceptive system 
that even a strictly flat, two dimensional image stimulates the 
feeling of three dimensionality (1954, 219). In this sense, we can 
never 'really’ see our visual field which is involuntarily 
transformed into different neural models of space. Goldstein shares 
the same belief with Arnheim concerning humans' innate drive of 
attributing a sense of 3-d space to any graphic configuration:
Spatial depth, defined as it is by the forms within and 
around it, is strongly suggested merely by drawing any 
simple doodle on a blank sheet of paper... any small
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shape will serve as a figure, instantly converting the 
blank page into a ground space. In fact, it requires a 
special effort to see a small shape as only a 
subdivision of the shape of the page. It seems we 
"want” to see volumes in space - we are primed for it 
(1989, 131).
With such a space-oriented system of pictorial · perception, even 
independent pieces of lines are perceived by any observer as linear 
masses that float in an empty volume. Arnheim calls such lines as 
"object lines" as they stimulate the feeling of concrete objects 
being detached from the graphic surface (1954, 219). Actually, the 
phenomenon of object line is a logical consequence of the law of 
simplicity: it is much simpler to perceive lines as objects residing 
’on’ a background that continues beneath rather than seeing both the 
lines and picture plane as the pieces of a whole surface. If the 
lines on the pictorial surface accumulate together they begin to 
simulate the feeling of a textured or shadowed ’surface* as ”hatch 
lines." This is also another instance of the neural drive towards 
simplicity: when the combination produces a simpler figure than the 
mere sum of separate lines would, it is seen as one integrated 
whole. This is known in Gestalt psychology as "the law of grouping 
by proximity" (Behrens 1986, 1-6). The neural optic area tends to 
group stimulus elements together if they excite cortical regions 
that are close to each other.
One of the most significant phenomena related to pictorial space in 
line drawings is the 'formation of contours' that stimulate the 
primary perceptual tendency towards discriminating 'depth levels* on 
a 2-d surface. Myers defines 'contour' as "the edge of a volume seen 
against a ground" (1989, 175). In contrast to the Gibsonian notion 
of contour as a pictorial invariant that refers to an
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environmentally unchanging structure under motion. Gestalt theory 
illustrates the phenomenon of pictorial contours along with figure- 
ground relationship by again referring to the law of simplicity. A 
contour, in Gestalt terms, is perceived to circumscribe a 'surface* 
not just because it is correlated with an environmental invariant; 
the perceptual experience of a contour line arises as a function of 
a preferred simplicity in the relevant depiction (Restle 1982, 
43). A single closed loop of circular line drawn on a white paper 
(figure 8) can be perceived either as a wireframe object through 
which the background can be seen or a flat form residing before a 
background overlapping it. However, the neural balance system 
prefers the latter interpretation due to a two steps simplification 
process.
figue 8
If we refer to Arnheim’s explanation of this phenomenon:
The assumption of an empty loop requires the observer 
to see the surface of the paper as a continuous 
background, or to put it differently, to see the spaces 
on both sides of the line as related to it 
symmetrically [symmetry is a strong Gestalt cue for 
figureness]. This works well as long as we are dealing 
with a straight line, but [here] such a symmetry is not 
supported by the shape of the loop, which creates a 
distinct difference between the small, closed, 
surrounded space inside and the unbounded, large, 
surrounding space outside (1954, 220).
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Due to the fact that the system apprehends the circular loop as a 
’figure' not a wireframe, the secondary process of simplification 
requires the distribution of the whole configuration into * two 
depth-levels’ rather than perceiving the disc as being inserted into 
a surface both sharing a common boundary.
In pictorial depictions of a higher complexity where two or more 
figures exist on the surface overlapping each other, the law of 
simplicity functions toward reducing the number of perceived depth 
levels.
In figure 9 the Gestaltian congruity of the two separate shapes 
would seem to support the interpretation of a three layered space 
consisting of a disc, a rectangle and the background surface 
respectively. However, the tendency towards the lowest number of 
depth levels wins the tug of war against simplicity of shapes and 
the drawing is perceived as a rectangular surface with a circular 
cut-out through which background surface is seen.
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The two elementary instances given above verify Arnheim’s well-known 
statement: "There is no such thing as a truly flat two-dimensional 
picture" (1954, 227). Human’s inherent tendency to impose spatial 
interpretations to pictures stimulates the formation of a figure- 
ground discrimination along with a perceived depth in any depiction. 
At this point Arnheim introduces the concept of 'subdivision* which 
is the psychophysiological process of subdividing the projected 
scene into different levels of depth for the sake of increasing 
simplicity. Accordingly:
. . . subdivision occurs when a combination of self- 
contained parts yields a structurally simpler pattern 
than the undivided whole...Areas physically located in 
the same picture plane split apart in depth and assume 
a figure-ground configuration because simplicity 
increases when the onesidedness of the contour is 
uncontested and when the ground can be seen as 
continuing beneath the figure without interruption 
(Arnheim 1954, 245).
The same tendency towards simplicity functions in the amodal 
completion of the occluded parts where the perceptual system imposes 
the most regular interpretation to the unseen part of a figure.
The Gestalt rules of pictorial perception just considered have 
generally been related to the depth separation of flat objects seen 
in front. The information related to spatial distance have been 
indefinite in those examples. However, pictorial forms can also give 
the impression of a thoroughly consistent and continuous sense of 
space again by stimulating the tendency towards neural relaxation 
(Arnheim 1988, 167-87). As formerly discussed, the basic tool of 
constructing such a strong sense of space is 'projective 
deformation' which forces the observer to convert the two 
dimensional image into a 3-d object. Accordingly, deformation
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decreases the simplicity of the pictorial image and increases 
tension in the visual field which consequently creates an urge 
towards a perceptual simplification.
The two 'deformed shapes' presented as figure 10 directly acquire 
spatial interpretations the left one being a plane receding in depth 
whereas the other being a three dimensional cube. Rather than seeing 
the configuration as two strange shapes made up of variously skewed 
rectangles the nervous system favors a right angled (simple) 
interpretation and attributes those skewed edges to the projective 
deformations caused by the objects' orientation through depth. If we 
think in Gibsonian terms, these two shapes represent features of two 
objects that would remain invariant when physically viewed in 
motion. In other words, pictures, according to Gibson, represent 
static correlates of the dynamic environment whereas these 
correlates (invariants) underlie the unitary act of seeing space. 
What we see in pictures, in this sense, are not forms but 
invariants. In direct opposition, Gestalt theory considers 
'projective forms' as the basis of pictorial as well as natural 
seeing. Accordingly, regardless of the fact whether the observer is 
confronted with a picture or a real object visual perception begins 
with a flat and static picture on which three dimensional 
interpretation is imposed for the sake of simplicity. Moreover, 
familiarity with the represented form (either on retina or a
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picture) does not affect the principle of simplicity even though the 
outcome percept may conflict with what is 'known' about the 
projected scene (Kubovy 1986, 97-8)·
In accordance with all these rules of Gestalt 'linear perspective,* 
rather than simply being a retinal image duplication, proves to be a 
'systematic method' of distorting the pictorial forms so that they 
can be perceptually interpreted as deviated projections of specific 
structures of space. Along with all the laws of simplicity formerly 
stated, basic linear perspective mostly uses two dominant rules of 
Gestalt which are right angledness and parallelism. As Shepard has 
experimentally demonstrated, human observers have a strong tendency 
to perceive a fork junction^ as a rectangular corner in space if 
each of the three angles of the fork exceeds 90® (1990, 183). This 
is the basic Gestaltian tendency towards right angledness. Also the 
tendency to parallelism drives observers to see converging lines as 
being parallel which recede towards a vanishing point.
figure 11
^ A fork junction is formed by the meeting of three straight lines at a point.
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These two basic laws of Gestalt clearly illustrate why we perceive 
the drawing presented as figure 11 as a rectangularly patterned 
tunnel receding through depth. Indeed, it is almost impossible to 
see what ’really' resides on the picture surface due to the neural 
search towards balance that prevents us seeing the trapezoidal 2-d 
shapes.
In opposition to Gibsonian assertion related to the primacy of 
texture gradients from which linear perspective is only a derivative 
Arnheim accepts the importance of line drawings in conveying the 
sense of space. Actually this is a logical consequence of the 
Gestaltian notion of pattern organisation: what we perceive is not 
only a projective duplicate but an organised and processed 
configuration derived from the captured scene. In this sense, the 
ordinary act of seeing is already 'pictorial' in essence as 
observers, just like a successful painter, tend to 'abstract' the 
implicit outlines from the projected retinal images of any real 
scene (Arnheim 1969, 27). Consequently, a representation does not 
need to duplicate the exact visual information to represent space 
sufficiently. As Arnheim declares:
Purely geometric line drawings such as converging 
checkerboard floors... contain most powerful depth 
gradients. This is so because the effectiveness of a 
perceptual gradient depends on the visual articulation 
of the pattern. The more explicitly the gradient is 
presented in shape, color or movement, the more 
compelling is the depth effect. Fidelity to the 
physical is not a crucial variable (1954, 276).
This is the major reason why Arnheim considers the sense of sight as 
'intelligent' (1969, 37-53). Though dissonating with the notion of 
direct and natural apprehension of pictorial space the intricate 
constructive processes of the visual system has driven him to use
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such a term. Nevertheless^ Arnheim is quite sure about the 
’psychophysiological’ bases of human’s direct apprehension of 
pictorial space which is based on an innate tendency toward neural 
relaxation.
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CHAPTER 4
4. BEHOLDER'S SHARE IN CONSTRUCTING PICTORIAL SPACE
The two approaches to pictorial space perception discussed as the 
second and third chapters of this study have been the 'projective* 
ones that illustrated the 'directness' and 'naturalness* of 
perceiving space from 2-d graphic configurations. While Gibson has 
presented a phenomenological approach with the idea of an 
'unmediated' perceptual process, Arnheim, along with the other 
supporters of Gestalt theory, has talked about a constructive but 
'innately founded' human ability of extracting space from two 
dimensional representations. On the theoretical scale of projective- 
constructive opposition Gestalt proves to be nearer to the 
constructivist extreme than the Gibsonian position. However, if we 
consider the issue from the viewpoint of innate-learned scale 
Gestalt and Gibsonian models fall within the same category having 
claimed the innate ability of humans in making sense of 2-d displays 
in terms of 3-d constructions. Due to this fundamental similarity in 
emphases some authors even treated these two distinct models as one 
unified theory (Millar 1994, 29-30).
4.1. Criticism of Gibson and Gestalt
Both Gibsonian and Gestalt models of pictorial space perception have 
been subjected to severe criticisms by a group of pictorial
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theorists who asserted that * any viewer's perceptual relation to a 
picture could not be as natural and direct as Gibson and Arnheim 
have thought to be.' According to Richard Gregory, Gestaltian notion 
of innateness is the consequence of a lack of clear evidence about 
'perceptual learning' at the time when Gestalt theory newly emerged. 
Gregory also considers the influence of contemporary German 
metaphysics as the other driving force beyond such a strong emphasis 
on 'innate human abilities' (1970, 20). Gestalt's 'dualism of form 
versus content' has been another point of criticism being a 
problematic concept that contaminated the theoretical apprehension 
of 'concrete thing perception' which actually operated in quite a 
different level than abstract gestalt forms (Ehrenzweig 1967, 18). 
It is known that in many instances object perception may precede the 
reception of gestalten which even evaporates without being slightly 
discerned. Julian Hochberg, the cognitive psychologist, is critical 
of both Gibsonian and Gestalt models of pictorial space perception 
speaking of the indeterminate bases from which these two theories 
stem from:
The mere fact that the appearance of a pattern cannot 
in general be completely predicted from the appearances 
of its parts presented in isolation does not by itself 
provide basis for reviving anything like Gestalt 
theory. And the mere fact that what has been called 
[Gibsonian] higher-order stimulus information about 
distal object properties are normally provided by the 
environment... by itself implies nothing whatsoever 
about the process of perception (1982, 191).
Hochberg's criticisms are stimulated by the ignorance of Gibsonian 
and Gestalt theories about the underlying mechanisms of perceptual 
phenomena. Both models tend to keep away from the idea of any 
intricate mental processes that can form the basis of the act of 
seeing. While the Gibsonian approach dispenses altogether with any 
mechanical explanations of picture-viewer relationship claiming the
59
importance of direct experience uncontaminated with any 
physiological, let alone cognitive, accounts, Gestalt theory 
constructs a graceful 'neurological fiction' based on one single 
principle -simplicity- for which all human physiology is supposed to 
strive·
The obvious advantage of Gibsonian and Gestalt accounts of pictorial 
perception is the elegant simplicity of the explanations they 
propose. Especially Gestalt model is an attractive alternative for a 
theorist who looks for the most 'parsimonious' explanation of the 
observed facts. The Gestaltian notion of isomorphism, the claim that 
the outer and inner phenomena have similar structures and are 
dominated by the same rules, is such a parsimonious explanation 
fitting well to Gestalt's eminent philosophy of simplicity (Attneave 
1982, 27).
While being quite simple and common sense explanations of the 
observed phenomena. Gestalt and Gibsonian theories, however, prove 
insufficient in elucidating the more probable underlying mechanisms 
of pictorial perception. A number of recent experiments proved the 
fact that the perceptual system carried out certain 'constructive' 
operations of extracting 3-d meanings from 2-d displays quite 
different than those modelled by Gestalt theory (in this sense 
Gibsonian account is absolutely irrelevant here without having 
proposed any probable perceptual mechanisms other than certain 
phenomenological accounts). These new experiments revealed that 
seeing is an activity based on memory oriented and computational 
procedures rather than being a direct physiological outcome of 
external stimuli. It was also experimentally proved that influence
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of expectations and cultural factors were quite high which 
conditioned a viewer's responses to the sense of space conveyed by a 
graphic configuration (Luria 1976, 41-5).
4.2. The Limited Angle of Sight
The most significant empirical finding than has cast doubt on both 
Gibsonian and Gestalt theories is the fact that human's visual 
system can capture a severely limited amount of information at a 
single glance. While formulating their theories of pictorial 
perception that depended on the 'direct apprehension of the entire 
visual field, ’ Gibson and Arnheim both ignored the fact that human 
viewers can see a too small amount of the graphic surface to capture 
it immediately as a 'whole' (Hochberg 1982, 192).
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The unusual drawing represented as figure 12 can be utilised as a 
good source to discover the temporal inability of the visual system 
in capturing extensive areas of pictorial surface. This is one of 
the most fcimous so called impossible objects, the Penrose Triangle, 
the observation of which disturbs any viewer with its inherently 
contradictory spatial construction. The drawing is so contrived that 
it is not possible for the 'eye' to settle for a consistent sense of 
concrete volume, as the three bars of the object are joined in such 
a manner to violate the physical laws of space. While the joints, 
viewed in isolation, indicate no spatial problem themselves, their 
mutual integration arises a sense of impossibility (Ernst 1992, 
33). Such a unique property of the Penrose Triangle enables us to 
probe the limits of the visual system in terms of the amount of 
information it can capture at a single glance. A brief 
phenomenological introspection immediately reveals that our 
experience of the figure is dominated by a 'desperate search for 
spatial coherence' through an unending act of visual scanning. We 
shift our gaze on the represented object tracing the main axes of 
its bars continually jumping from one corner to the other with the 
aim of mentally assembling the 'separately captured' visual 
information. Here, the sense of impossibility is actually an outcome 
of 'the eye’s inability of seeing the whole figure at once.' We 
capture the internally consistent sense of 'pictorial' space in one 
selected corner and proceed to the next one while keeping the former 
in 'mind.' This is a piecemeal and sequential process through which 
the picture is inspected for coherence. In the case of Penrose 
Triangle this process goes on without an eventual ending as the 
third captured edge always destroys the sense of consistent space 
conferred by the two former ones. If we were able to see the figure
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in its entirety, in accordance with the Gestalt account, we would 
definitely have denied the rather 'complex' three dimensionality 
thus the impossibility of the drawing settling for a two- 
dimensional, flat interpretation. However, as the viewer is limited 
to a very small angle of sight, the artist can easily draw an 
impossible object which presents a contradictory structure for the 
'sequential' sight system of human observers. It is actually not so 
easy to sense this sequential system in 'normal' pictures and real 
scenes as, in those cases, the search for coherence is satisfied in 
such an immediacy that we can not become aware of the act of 
scanning that underlies the processes of vision.
Figure 13, drawn by Hochberg, is a simpler evidence of this 
phenomenon which illustrates the fact that our spatial apprehension 
of a whole graphic display is constrained/determined by a very 
limited angle of sight (Hochberg 1982, 192).
figure 13
The whole perceived spatial structure of the drawn rectangular box 
in figure 13 assumes a distinct organisation depending on which 
point the gaze is directed at. When point 2 constitutes the focus of 
attention the line/edge proximate to this point assumes a closer 
position in space despite the contradictory information presented by 
the surface near 1. Inversely, if the gaze is directed at point 1 
then the whole object reverses in depth assuming a totally different
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space structure. Many other similar experiments carried out with 
ambiguous figures illustrate that different percepts can arise by 
merely shifting the attention to different parts of drawn figures 
(Benjafield 1992, 167-8). At this point, it seems quite hard to 
preserve the old faith in the Gestaltian notion of 'the whole that 
determines the meaning/appearance of subparts' as the above reviewed 
observational evidence proves the contrary: subparts can determine 
the meaning/appearance of the whole.
While not completely negating the concept of perceptual disposition 
towards simplicity, which is actually a favorable state of internal 
representation, the above reviewed evidence related to 'stimulus 
limits and visual scanning' surely invalidates the holistic 
principles of Gestalt and the idea of 'isomorphic/physiological' 
tendency towards neural relaxation. Hochberg claims that many 
theorists that support a projective theory of pictorial space ignore 
the question of stimulus limits and all of the associated issues 
which naturally accompany that question (1982, 192).
4.3. Memory
The limitation of sight angle and the process of visual scanning 
imply a significant theoretical assumption: if for much of normal 
perception the effective stimulus span in space and time is too 
small to instantaneously capture the visual field as a whole then 
'mental structures' must comprise a substantial part of the 
perceptual processes (Hochberg 1982, 195). A part of such a mental 
structure should be a short-term memory that has to be used in 
saving/remembering a previously captured visual stimulus to mentally
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combine it with the following one. In this way the separate 
'snapshots’ of the explored area are assembled in the viewer's brain 
to form a coherent sense of space unless the viewed object is an 
internally inconsistent depiction that stimulates an unending and 
desperate cycle of visual scanning (Kosslyn 1990^ 87-94). Other 
than this primary mechanism of visual reading (short term memory)^ 
experimental evidence points to the presence of a second type of 
mental structure. The process of visual inspection proceeds in such 
an ordered way that implies the probable existence of 
•predetermined' mental attitudes reserved for different 'kinds' of 
visible entities. This points to a 'long term memory' that guides 
the perceptual attitude to different visual objects by providing a 
rather large scale of mental scheme. In the drawing represented as 
figure 12 our experience of the Penrose Triangle is dominated by a 
highly organised pattern of visual exploration which doesn't seem to 
be a product of immediate decisions. Rather, we adopt a definite 
strategy of visualisation determined by the properties of the 
illustration. Being conditioned by such a mental scheme perception 
proves to be something highly structured where the saccades^ are 
programmed in advance as discrete steps as to when, where and how 
far the eye will next be sent depending on the confronted object of 
vision (Hochberg 1982, 204). A piece of written text, an 
impossible object drawn in outline form and an open spectacle of 
landscape all require different reading strategies, and it is highly 
improbable that these mental entities are innately found in human 
physiology. Departing from all these premises it is not implausible 
to say that "memory", which provides the viewer with relevant
^ Tlic eyes ’’jump" from one visible region lo the oUier one rather tlian scanning the field in a gradual 
progression. Each visual jump is called a "saccadc.”
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methods of seeing, is an important part of humans’ perceptual access 
to the outer world.
4.4. Pictures versus Reality
Having talked about the requirement of distinct mental attitudes for 
the perception of different objects, at this point, the genuine 
difference between pictures and reality should be emphasised. In 
Shepard’s words, a drawing, objectively, is ’only an array of marks 
on a two dimensional surface" which bears no intrinsic likeness to 
its objects of depiction (1990, 158). Though one may strongly
resemble an outline figure to a person, such a resemblance can never 
be proved in objective methods. What, indeed, can be the physical 
relation between a number of nested lines aligned on a small piece 
of flat surface and a real human being that has a concrete volume in 
space? Actually, a two dimensional representation, either a high 
quality photograph or a loosely prepared line drawing, can really 
reflect only a very limited number of physical properties of the 
model object it belongs to (Gombrich 1992, 236). Viewed from this
point, pictorial space perception, in opposition to the projective 
theory, can be considered as the product of a "remarkable kind of 
problem solving which is ’only partly similar’ to reading reality of 
normal objects..." (Gregory 1970, 33). Though both depend on the
piecemeal scanning process of the perceptual system, real and 
pictorial space should logically require different mental states as 
well as different exploration strategies. Therefore, pictorial space 
perception can not be taken as a direct consequence of the humans* 
ability to perceive the real space. It requires the development of a 
particular mental attitude and a specialised long-term memory that
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can 'construct' the sense of space 'coded' through the outlines or 
color patches of a drawing.
4,5. Constructivist Approach
The dominant theoretical paradigm that is gathered around these 
experimental evidences and the premises thus derived is the 
'constructivist' or the 'computational' approach to pictorial space 
perception which models picture-viewer relationship as a 
constructive/computational process accomplished by the 'active 
involvement of viewer's memory.' Accordingly, to perceive the 
virtual space represented in a drawing involves a piecemeal 
'reading' process (as illustrated in the above examples) guided by a 
previously acquired directory of experience with 2-d graphic 
configurations. In this sense, to construct the pictorial space 
conveyed by a graphic configuration requires a body of pictorial 
knowledge in the part of the viewer the absence of which converts 
any picture to nothing more than a flat surface stained with 
irregular and meaningless lines and patches of color. Being a 
product of perceptual learning, this pictorial directory can easily 
change in accordance to prevailing artistic and representational 
conventions. Without doubt, a European viewer probably perceives a 
perspective drawing quite different than a Far-Eastern viewer or a 
tribesman that has lived in the forests of South Africa. Different 
pictorial conventions bring the development of different mental 
directories/habits of picture reading, and no one can claim the 
superiority of one pictorial convention over the other as there 
cannot be a transcendent and objective method of representing the 
real world on flat surfaces (Jamake 1994, 92).
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Before dealing directly with the constructive processes of pictorial 
space perception, ’constructivism’ as a significant paradigm of 
psychological sciences, here, deserves attention. At the core of the 
constructivist assessment lies the premise that human beings are not 
passive receptors of incoming stimuli but they are involved in an 
active process of constructing ’meaning’ by utilising their 
’recollections’ plus what they capture from the sensible 
environment. As Neimeyer puts it:
Constructivism is founded on the premise of meaning 
making; being human entails active efforts to interpret 
experience, seeking purpose and significance in the 
events that surround us...It is this drive toward 
meaning , this effort to forge significance and purpose 
from elements of experience, that typifies the human 
enterprise and that serves as the cornerstone of 
constructivist thinking (1993, 4).
Through his search after meaning in the environment, the human 
perceiver refers to his previously acquired directory of knowledge 
to supplement his sense impressions. Dretske models the process of 
visual perception in the same way:
The main function of the visual system is to take the 
visual data and construct, as best it can, a reasonable 
’hypothesis” (judgement) about the source of this 
stimulation. The conclusion that the perceptual system 
reaches constitutes the subject’s perception of a 
definite object (1990, 139).
In the constructivist model of perception the perceiver, rather than 
extracting pure data from the available stimulus, ’adds’ information 
to what he senses to reach a perceptual outcome. For, in 
constructivist terms, the primary stimulation that originates from 
an object is inherently ambiguous that needs cognitive 
supplementation to become something understandable (Dretske 1990,
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139). As evident with regard to all these formulations, the 
constructivist notion of ’mediated' perception is essentially 
different from the corresponding concept of mediation proposed by 
Gestalt theorists. While Gestalt illustrates the viewer’s process of 
perceptual construction as essentially an innately founded 
physiological function based on neural activities, the similar 
process is illustrated by the constructivist theory as an act of 
mental computation based on not analog but symbolic memory 
representations. In other words, from the viewpoint of 
constructivist assessment, what goes on in the perceiver*s brain 
does not bare any analogic resemblance to its outer stimulus source 
whereas actually it is an act of logical comparison carried out 
between what is ’known’ and what is ’seen’ the underlying 
physiological mechanisms of which remains yet unknown.
4.6. Software and Hardware
Here, the concepts ’software/hardware’ used in computer terminology 
can be exploited as an illustrative analogy to further elucidate the 
perceptual approach the constructivists adopt (Benjafield 1992, 
27). Gestalt can be considered as a theory which tries to model the 
'hardware' (the physical structure) of the perceptual system with 
its emphasis on neurological functions and analog processes. 
Accordingly, the basic perceptual activities carried out by the 
human perceiver is the ’legal’ functions of his physiological 
hardware that can not be changed by any processes of learning. 
Gestaltian hardware of the perceptual system is the cortical "field" 
of the human brain which is always 'on' through the process of 
reducing neural balance by altering perceptions. The constructivist
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model, on the other hand, deals with how the perceptual system is 
’programmed" to carryout certain routines/sof twares rather than 
trying to attribute the observed phenomena to an imagined perceptual 
hardware the exact structure of which, after all, can not be fully 
understood. Ulric Neisser, one of the founders of cognitive 
psychology, bases his theory of visual cognition on a similar 
analogy with computers:
The task of a psychologist trying to understand human 
cognition is analogous to that of a man trying to 
discover how a computer has been programmed... if the 
program seems to 'store' and 'reuse' information, he 
would like to know by what "routines" or "procedures" 
this is done... he will not care much [how] his 
particular computer stores information... he wants to 
understand the program, not the "hardware." A program 
[software) is not a machine; it is a series of 
instructions for dealing with symbols...The cognitive 
psychologist would like to give a similar account of 
the way information is processed by people (1967, 6- 
8 ).
The concept of 'mental software' also implies the variable and 
inconsistent nature of human perception. For, if similar 
machines/hardwares can be programmed to execute vastly different 
applications, human brain, with its programmable nature, can also 
'run' innumerably different procedures of visual perception. In this 
sense, different cultures and conventions of depiction can all be 
attributed to different softwares of seeing.
4.7. Information Processing Theory
Constructivist theory of pictorial space perception adopts the 
'information-processing' model of cognitive psychology as a main 
guide through which it deals with perceptual issues. Accordingly, 
human mind possesses a finite number of basic mechanisms for 
processing information, mechanisms that can be grouped or arranged
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into strategies, or programs in the computer sense, that allows 
complex [perceptual] problems to be solved. The basic structure of 
such an act of problem solving is constrained by the memory 
capacities of the human mind. As the 'human's short term memory' is 
seen inadequate to handle a problematic situation with a totalising 
approach the problem solver has to fragment the problem area into 
elementary subtasks which are inturn solved in a sequential fashion 
(Rowe 1992, 51). In the context of picture viewing, the elementary 
pieces of this stepwise info-process are the snapshots separately 
captured from the graphic surface. The distinct pieces of spatial 
meanings derived from the picture are processed within the domain 
determined by the short term memory (STM)^. As evident from the 
formerly given example of Penrose Triangle the capacity of the 
short-term visual memory is quite poor requiring saccadic eye 
movements to apprehend the 'whole' picture and to 'refresh' the 
parts of the scene deleted due to the continuous income of new 
information. The basic function of 'long term memory' (LTM), in this 
system, is to provide the general strategy of "information pick-up" 
determined by the object of vision. In this sense, LTM proves to be 
a directory of pictorial meanings acquired in time by a process of 
so called 'perceptual learning.' The pattern of visual snapshots and 
the general strategy of pictorial meaning attribution is directed by 
LTM which 'runs' the relevant software of 'spatial meaning 
extraction' depending on the kind of 2-d configuration confronted. 
LTM chooses the most appropriate way of 'reading' the picture within 
a search space of available pictorial knowledge.
^  Being tlic active pari of the system wliere goes on real-time pr(x:essing, short-term memory is also 
known as "working memory"
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4.8. Beholder's Share: The Constructivist Model of 
Pictorial Space Perception
The fundamental premises of the constructivist theory of pictorial 
perception have been summarised up to here. The following part of 
this section will concentrate more on the details of constructivist 
model by considering the ideas of two eminent theorists that seem to 
lead this approach in the field of pictorial theory. Ernst Gombrich 
(art historian) and Richard Gregory (psychologist) are the most 
influential personalities of the theoretical domain that represents 
the constructivist position. Both Gombrich and Gregory, in their 
treatises, illustrate pictorial space as a memory based 'construct* 
of the human mind. The title of this section, "Beholder's Share," is 
inspired by Gombrich's well known expression which he uses to denote 
the 'active involvement' of the observer in extracting spatial 
meanings from pictures (1992).
Utilising the fundamental assumptions of information-processing 
model of cognitive psychology, Gregory and Gombrich illustrate the 
process of pictorial space perception as a stepwise perceptual 
inquiry made up of basic constructive processes. The units/steps of 
this process are the 'snapshots' sequentially captured from the 
graphic area. Each of these is limited by the constraints of the 
treatable stimulus size which is not more than a couple of degrees. 
Constrained by such limitations the perceptual system carries out a 
two-step constructive activity. Throughout each instance the eyes 
capture a new portion of the pictorial image: formation of an object 
hypothesis and verification of it by a comparison made with the one 
developed for the previously captured portion. Viewed from this
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point, pictorial space, rather than being determined by the stimulus 
patterns - the graphic configuration itself, proves to be the 
consequence of a 'dynamic search' for the best 'interpretation' of 
the available pictorial data (Gregory 1990, 21). In other words,
the perceived pictorial space is the object hypothesis mentally 
approved to possess the highest probability to be represented on the 
graphic surface. Being such a highly constructive process, 
perceiving the pictorial space requires a special state of mind that 
is characterised by a 'readiness' to attribute probable meanings to 
inherently meaningless lines and patches of color, and the strategy 
of such a meaning attribution is determined by the ingredients of 
viewer's 'memory.' The information related to the hypothesised 
objects and the appropriate mode of scanning relevant to the 
particular type of depiction both reside in the 'mental directory' 
formerly named as Long Term Memory. Without such a directory of 
knowledge any picture whether a photograph or a loosely drawn 
caricature turns into a piece of paper stained with meaningless 
patches of color. Thus, the first step in the process of pictorial 
space construction, after mentally deciding that the encountered 
object 'is' a picture made to be looked at, is the retrieval of the 
most appropriate strategy of scanning relevant to the kind of 
picture confronted. An outline drawing, a photograph or an abstract 
painting all require different modes of visual inspection. Following 
this fundamental process of mode decision, the eyes scan the graphic 
surface sequentially capturing different patches of pictorial data. 
For each snapshot the system develops an object
hypothesis/anticipation that requires to be 'confirmed (Benjafield 
1992, 167). The process of confirmation is actually a consistency
test carried out among the captured snapshots saved within the
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limited capacity of the Short Term Memory. If one particular object 
hypothesis does not require any revision or change during the 
following sequence of snapshots then it is said to be ’confirmed.’ 
In this sense, the determining factor in the construction of 
pictorial space proves to be the ’internal coherence' of the 
developed hypotheses/anticipations. When the internal congruity of 
the picture is confirmed within the perceptually determined 
picturing conventions then the observer is said to 'see* the 
represented space.
Beholder's Share in constructing pictorial space can be illustrated 
by using an analogy with the basic act of understanding the spoken 
and written language. Though we generally experience no difficulty 
in our oral communication with people this is not just because 
everybody uses certain 'exactly determined speech sounds’ that refer 
to corresponding concepts residing in a common mental directory. An 
attentive auditory observation easily reveals that spoken 
representation of a certain concept varies among people in terms of 
produced tones, accents and certain omitted sounds. If we relied 
merely on the selection of precisely fixed sound correspondences 
from a predetermined directory (language) it would probably be 
impossible for people to orally communicate. Rather than passively 
waiting for the exact verbal correlates of meanings to be aurally 
produced we 'listen' to speeches in a peculiarly 'tuned' way; we 
develop anticipations about what can be said/meant in a certain 
logical context. While different languages are quite large contexts 
of developing anticipations there are innumerably various small 
scale contexts for the listener to get adapted. This constructive 
role of the listener in understanding the spoken language is quite
74
obvious in listening a radio prograirane corrupted with noise. If the 
listener ascertains the specific language and the theme of the 
broadcasted speech then he can 'mentally compensate' for many 
actually non heard words and sentences. Such a speech is said to be 
understood if the anticipations/hypotheses developed all through the 
listened part form an internal coherence. Surely, this process works 
only if the listener is familiar with the specific language being 
spoken as mental compensation requires an established directory 
(LTM) of speech sounds without which any talk becomes a meaningless 
aggj70gate of noise. Reading a piece of written text requires a 
similar act of mental construction as the reader scans the lines 
with certain expectations determined by the above mentioned factors 
of context. This is why we usually do not notice misprints 
perceptually correcting them being guided by a long term memory.
4.9. The Effort After Meaning
Meaning construction is a deeply ingrained tendency of any human 
perceiver which even obstructs him from perceiving anything as 
totally 'meaningless.' This is what Bartlett termed as the 'effort 
after meaning,' an inherently founded disposition of all human 
beings in making sense of their tangible environment (Gombrich 
1982, 179) . We do not give up the process of mental search and 
meaning attribution till we believe that what lies before us have a 
certain significance and structure that we can understand. This is 
the main reason why oculists, who wish to test our eyesight, use 
random letters rather than coherent texts as they aim at separating 
what is 'really' sensed from what is 'logically anticipated' 
(Gombrich 1982, 179). The perceptual effort after meaning is
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mostly evident in Rorschach inkblots which are drawn intentionally 
to stimulate the dynamic construction of different perceived objects 
as they do not favour one definite object-hypothesis to be adopted 
by the viewer.
figure 14
The unique aspect of a Rorschach depiction is the essential 
impossibility of settling for a concretely established spatial 
meaning for what is seen on the paper surface. Despite this intended 
ambiguity, however, people still tend to ’see’ certain objects in 
Rorschach inkblots. As Gregory states:
Ink spot or object? The Rorschach personality test 
depends on the fact that we tend to ’see’ objects even 
in the most ill-structured figures... An ink spot has 
an unlimited number [of interpretations], with no one 
highly probable. We tend to select objects which have 
interest: perceptual and personality differences may 
appear in the selection (1970, 38).
The piecemeal scanning process that looks for the confirmation of an 
anticipated object hypothesis, confronted by such an ambiguous 
inkblot, enters into a loop hitting continually upon different 
percepts determined by various continually changing mental factors.
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The other extreme point along such a scale of meaning attribution 
would be a faithfully rendered perspective picture (without 
intentionally inserted paradoxes) which utilises the commonly 
accepted conventions of pictorial space. Such representations are 
immediately apprehended by viewers as they guide the [western] 
perceivers' effort after meaning by exploiting the 'most commonly 
used routine' of spatial meaning extraction. Due to their ease and 
immediacy of being perceived, perspective depictions are generally 
accepted to be 'natural' ways of representing space. In technical 
terms, a detailed perspective construction, nevertheless, can be 
said to 'resemble' its model object model more than a cubist 
painting. For linear perspective possesses an objective component; 
it gives the technically sound knowledge of occlusion. In other 
words, by looking at a perspective depiction the viewer can 
correctly learn what things are visually occluded at the exact 
vantage point from which the representation is constructed. Also the 
information of color can be given as another component of relative 
objectivity (Gombrich 1982, 187-201). However, all these by no 
means imply that perspective does not need beholder's share. The 
only thing is that it is 'easier to learn' the conventions of 
linear perspective than the rules of a complicated written language 
or a highly symbolic procedure of picturing. Such an ease makes the 
process of perceptual reading so transparent that it drives people 
to consider perspective as a 'natural' way of pictorially 
representing space while it is definitely not so.
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The complex underlying mechanisms of 'reading' pictorial space can 
be most obviously discerned in Escher's illustrations where he has 
depicted spatial structures that seem 'impossible' to exist in the 
real world (Locher 1992). These illustrations are Gombrich's most 
commonly referred material in unveiling the obscure perceptual 
processes of pictorial space construction/perception (Gombrich 1965, 
154-56).
4.10. E s c h e r :  R e a d i n g  t h e  I m p o s s i b l e  S p a c e
figure 15
A typical Escher illustration initially encourages the viewer to 
adopt the 'regular' mode of picture reading ordinarily utilised by 
any contemporary observer accustomed to seeing perspective pictures. 
However, following a brief period of visual exploration the viewer 
discerns, for his surprise, that the reading strategy normally 
utilised for ordinary perspectives do not suffice to 'construct' a
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proper sense of space with this graphic configuration. For Escher's 
'virtual space' possesses some unresolveable contradictions avoiding 
the perceiver to perceptually settle for a concretely founded space 
structure. Solid and Hollow presented in figure 15 is such a typical 
Escher print that disturbs the viewer by presenting mutually 
conflicting spatial data which avoid the endurance of any 'concrete 
object hypothesis' during the process of sequential reading. 
Starting from the left side of the illustration the perceiver/reader 
easily proceeds without any interruption as the constructed scene is 
internally consistent: a black woman walking over a curved bridge 
toward a series of downward stairs. Similarly, the reading process 
if started from the opposite (right) side does not cause any 
perceptual problems either: a man climbing a ladder through a space 
vaulted by a large bridge. However, a catastrophic problem arises 
when the reader tries to cross the central axis: the object 
hypotheses held upto that point do not work anymore and the sense of 
pictorial space totally collapses urging the viewer into a desperate 
eye search to rebuild the coherence. This search in turn reveals 
that everywhere in the depiction corresponding shapes must be read 
as hollow in one context and solid in another and, every time, the 
meeting of both readings create a stalemate. In Gombrich's words: 
"The assumption with which we have started breaks down, and we have 
to begin all over again, only to discover that here too we are led 
into perplexity" (1965, 155).
Actually, there is nothing impossible in Escher's illustration. The 
contemporary viewer has internalised the language of linear 
perspective in such a strong manner that he can not 'see' the 
depiction as a flat surface. His mind, rather, penetrates the
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picture surface forgetting that the encountered object is no more 
than a flat configuration of lines and variously tinted stains. This 
is the essential weakness of the perceiver on which Escher builds 
all his 'magic' depictions. It is easy to 'fool' such a conditioned 
mind for which the process of reading and hypothesis confirmation 
have become so transparent. Gombrich deems Escher's prints as 
unique tools for revealing the hidden complexity of all picture 
reading:
What [Escher's] prints have in common is that they 
compel us to adopt an initial assumption [hypothesis] 
that can not be sustained as we try to follow it 
through...When we look at a 'normal' representation, 
there is nothing to prevent us from forming a 
hypothesis about the figure-ground relationship or 
about the way the shapes add up to pictures of objects. 
We therefore believe that we take in the picture more 
or less at one glance and recognise the motif. Our 
experience with Escher's contradiction shows that this 
account is inadequate. We read a picture, as we read a 
printed line, by picking up letters or cues and fitting 
them together till we feel that we look across the 
signs on the page at the meaning behind them ( 1965, 
155) .
4.11. Culture and Illusion
Such an internalised 'language' of pictorial space , the linear 
perspective, also causes the contemporary Western viewer to become 
highly vulnerable to certain types of pictorial illusions. One such 
illusion is aroused by the so called Muller-Lyer arrows which 
manifests itself by the perception of an illusory difference between 
two lines actually having similar sizes.
> <
figure 16
80
Gregory regards the effect aroused by the Muller-Lyer arrows as a 
'cognitive' illusion caused by the deeply internalised rules linear 
perspective ( 1994, 2 53). The line at the top 'seems' to be longer 
than the one at the bottom as it carries a fundamental cue for 
farness: the lines that are parallel to each other seem to converge 
as the distance increases, and the inverted arrows of the top figure 
confer such a cue. The perceptual system culturally programmed to 
'run' the software of linear perspective develops different object 
hypotheses for the two lines the objective sizes of which are 
exactly the same. The cultural/cognitive bases of this illusion is 
also confirmed by the evidence derived from the experiments carried 
out with people alien to our pictorial culture. It has been observed 
that many African tribesmen, who had spent their lives among forests 
and irregularly shaped huts, did not experience the Muller-Lyer 
figures as we did.
figure 17
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In this sense, such people, who do not know how to ’read' our 
language of pictorial space, can not be supposed to construct one of 
the monsters in figure 17 as larger than the other.
82
5. DENOTED SPACE: GOODMAN AND PICTORIAL LANGUAGE
The previous chapter has considered the 'constructivist* views of 
Gombrich and Gregory who illustrate the perception of pictorial 
space as a 'piecemeal act' of mental construction. The underlying 
structure of the model was essentially based on the premises of 
information-processing school of psychology the founder of which was 
Ulric Neisser (1967). Neisser had constructed this cognitive system 
as the incorporation two essential parts. Accordingly, Short Term 
Memory (working memory) was responsible for the basic act of visual 
scanning, and the strategy of scanning and meaning attribution was 
derived from the ingredients of Long Term Memory which consisted of 
a directory of learned viewing habits and pictorial conventions. 
Characterised by such mechanistic theories of cognitive psychology 
the previous section dealt with intricate psychological mechanisms 
of pictorial seeing. For, the justification of the basic arguments 
stated by Gregory and Gombrich required the treatment of such 
technical details related to graphic perception. The present 
chapter, however, differs from the preceding one in this respect. 
Dealing with the extreme point of constructivism related to 
pictorial vision "The Denoted Space", as the title itself implies, 
concentrates more on the aspects of cultural relativism and 
signification rather than any mechanical or physiological systems. 
As a result, the scope of this chapter transcends the boundaries of
CHAPTER 5
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the subject ^pictorial space” dealing with certain essential 
questions related to pictorial representation in general.
5.1. Gombrich*s Relatively Naturalistic Approach
Here, the essential difference between the notions of constructivism 
presented by this and the previous chapter requires focus. The 
difference lies in Gombrich's particular approach to pictorial 
vision. While supporting the constructivist paradigm of picture- 
viewer relationship Gombrich presents a peculiar attitude towards 
the opposition of nature versus pictorial conventions which puts him 
in a place one step before the extreme constructivism. The 
historical and regional preference for a certain style/type of 
depiction, in Gombrich's model, proves to be far from being 'totally 
arbitrary' conditioned by 'natural metaphors, the biological 
significance of the depicted scene or the object and particular 
constraints of the human's perceptual system. Therefore, the 
relation of a picture to what it represents, though the depiction 
itself requires beholder's active involvement to be read correctly, 
does not display the same relation as a word does to what it 
denotes. There may exist a more 'inherent association. These views 
of Gombrich, actually, do not damage his notion of 'viewer’s 
constructive engagement' in extracting space from pictures. However, 
they put him in a place through the theoretical scale a bit distant 
from the extreme point of constructivist assessment.
In the previous chapter, the aspects of relative objectivity that 
Gombrich attributes to perspective were very briefly considered. 
Accordingly, a picture drawn in correct linear perspective was 'more
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alike’ its object of depiction than a cubist painting in a number of 
features. Perspective, while still requiring a perceptual 
construction in the part of the observer, possessed a certain degree 
of reliable information about what it depicts. Through the following 
parts of this chapter, Gombrich’s above mentioned aspects of 
pictorial objectivity will be treated in more detail to compare his 
approach with the extreme point of constructivism represented by 
Nelson Goodman in which pictorial depiction proves to be exactly 
similar to verbal description.
5.2. Intended Purposes of the Depictions
Before emphasising the objective aspects of pictorial representation
Gombrich, in his article "Mirror and Map," warns visual theorists
not to fall into a very common pitfall which is the main reason for
many scholars to become radical constructivists. Accordingly, before
'deciding directly' about the utilised conventions of picturing that
point to the existence of different visual languages, the intended
'purposes’ of the investigated pictures should be extracted
(Gombrich 1982, 188). In Gombrich’s view the ignorance to this
aspect of pictorial depiction drives visual theorists to adopt
absolutely relativistic approaches; they do not consider the
originally intended purposes of the pictures they are analysing and
attribute all the representational peculiarities to cultural
relativism. As Gombrich, himself, states:
...the great variety of styles we encounter in the 
images of past and present civilisations cannot be 
assessed and interpreted without a clear understanding 
of the dominant purpose they are intended to serve. It 
is the neglect of this dimension which has suggested to 
some critics that the range of representational styles 
must somehow reflect a variety of ways in which the 
world is seen. There is only one step from this 
assumption to the assertion of a complete cultural
85
relativism which denies that there are standards of 
accuracy in visual representation because it is all a 
matter of convention (1982, 188).
Here Gombrich gives the example of the ancient Egyptian convention 
of drawing architectural entities in the shape of their ground plan 
while men in elevation as shown in figure 18
figure 18
Rather than assuming immediately that the ancient Egyptians had seen 
their world this way or attributing the form of such a depiction to 
a rigidly established language of visualisation, it seems a better 
start to investigate the end purposes such a picture would have been 
drawn for (Gombrich 1992, 127-32). Gombrich resembles this style
of depiction to the mapping conventions very commonly utilised in 
today's tourist-guides which represent a scaled plan of the relevant 
city overlapped by the appearance of certain sites in side view 
( 1982, 187 ). Everybody is sure that the tourist guides do not
represent a way of seeing the environment. They are drawn in 
accordance to certain functions to be fulfilled: to show the paths 
to follow while depicting the outer appearance of certain sites 
worth visiting. In this sense, every historical depiction should be 
inquired by keeping in mind the fact that it could have been 
constructed to serve a very particular purpose other than a desire
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of representing the seen environment as it is experienced. For the 
visual theorist it is crucial to clarify the intended purposes of 
the inquired depiction to separate the functional forms from ways of 
seeing and depicting. This is the main argument which conditions 
Gombrich's attitude to analysing certain historical forms without 
falling into absolute relativism.
5.3. Natural Metaphors
Reminding the visual theorist about the importance of the intended 
purposes on which depictions may be based Gombrich goes on to 
consider the relatively 'natural' aspects of pictorial 
representation which may confer standards of objectivity. He 
believes that while certain representations are not duplications of 
reality in any sense of the term, they should not necessarily be 
•totally arbitrary' also (1982, 184). In this context, Gombrich 
considers the pictorial correspondence of color as a 'natural 
metaphor' the reception of which is relatively more 'direct' and 
less arbitrary than other elements of pictorial description. He 
again utilises maps to illustrate this notion of pictorial 
objectivity:
We would be puzzled to find a map of London in which 
the parks were marked blue and the ponds green, because 
the other arrangement is so much easier to learn and 
keep in mind. It would be interesting to investigate 
cartographic codes from this viewpoint of mnemonics. A 
map in the Times Atlas representing temperatures in 
various latitudes shows the warmer regions in darker 
red and the cold ones blue. No doubt we could also 
learn the opposite code, but why not make use of these 
'natural metaphors'? (1982, 184).
Gombrich attributes the conventionalisation of the use of these 
natural color correlates to the historical interest in conceptual
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categorisation. Another evidence he gives for the existence of a 
standard of objectivity related to pictorial representation is the 
common practice of converting photographic negatives into positives. 
Actually, the negative version of a photographically captured scene 
contains exactly the same visual data with its positive print. 
However, all through the history of photography, negative films have 
always been printed in positive regardless of the fact that the 
latter is no better than the former in terms of the conveyed 
information. For Gombrich this conversion can not be due to an 
arbitrary habit: "In any case if it were just a conventional 
notation the inventors of photography would not have evolved the 
process of turning a negative into a positive. It is most 'unlikely* 
that it is merely our habituation which makes it easier for us to 
read the latter" (1982, 186). Positives are easier to be read as 
they provide the viewer with more 'direct, ' not to say exact, 
information related to the captured scene. They utilise the natural 
metaphor of relative color correspondence.
5.4. Scale of Learning Ease-Difficulty
Surely, Gombrich does not claim for the existence of an absolutely 
'objective' method of representing space on two dimensional 
surfaces. He neither denies the fact that innumerable conventions of 
depiction can be learned by viewers to the extent of accepting those 
conventions to be ultimate ways of picturing. What Gombrich, rather, 
talks about is a continuous scale of learning ease/difficulty 
determined by the peculiar form of the depiction. In his article 
"Image and Code" he declares:
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As soon as we approach our problem from this angle, the 
angle of the ease of acquisition, the traditional 
'opposition' between 'nature' and 'convention' turns 
out to be misleading. What we observe is rather a 
continuum between skills which come naturally to us and 
skills which may be next to impossible for anyone to 
acquire. Surely a cipher machine can operate with 
constantly varying codes which no human brain could 
master and apply (1982, 283).
Viewed from this point, it proves deceptive to equate verbal 
language with pictorial representation as the latter have a mobility 
on the nature-convention scale whereas the former resides on the 
pure convention point except a few voice metaphors like 
onomatopoeia. As a logical consequence, it is frequently easier to 
pick up a pictorial code and adjust to its notation than to learn a 
foreign language.
5.5. Biological Significance and Constraints of 
the Perceptual System
Other than the use of natural metaphors like the color 
correspondence just mentioned, the scale of learning ease/difficulty 
in pictorial representation is determined by the biological 
significance of the confronted depiction and the constraints of the 
perceptual system which determines the limits of what can be 
perceived and adopted as a pictorial style. To illuminate the 
concept of biological significance Gombrich offers to carry out 
experiments with people foreign to our pictorial culture. Though the 
untutored tribesmen who live in dense forests may display difficulty 
to decode even a high resolution photograph, the crucial point for 
Gombrich, here is how much time it takes for the subject to learn 
this language. To quote Gombrich again:
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...it would also have to be asked whether any 
difficulty is experienced in recognising, for instance, 
toy animals made of wood or outline drawings of 
f€UT\iliar objects, particularly of features of immediate 
cultural and psychological significance. Investigators 
appear to have been shy, for instance, of using erotic 
imagery, though the reactions to this kind of material 
by the most untutored does not appear to suggest great 
difficulty in learning its significance (1982, 186).
Accordingly, the time interval required to learn how to decode a 
verbal description of a naked woman should differ from the one 
required to perceive a nude in a painting. The code of the latter 
surely demands quite a less time to be acquired. Gombrich presents 
this fact as a strong evidence against the commonly believed 
discrete opposition between nature versus representation. Another, 
rather less obvious, evidence set against the belief in the total 
arbitrariness of pictorial representation is the existence of 
certain constraints in the perceptual system beyond which any 
pictorial convention can not be stretched. The most well-known 
example for such -a constraint is given by Michael Kubovy in his 
treatise written about Renaissance perspective (1986, 120-1). 
Kubovy shares the same beliefs with Gombrich regarding the objective 
aspects of linear perspective, and he sets out to show how this 
pictorial tool can not be deemed as an arbitrary method of spatial 
representation since it is constrained thus shaped by certain 
limitations and tendencies of the perceptual system. In this context 
Kubovy criticises Nelson Goodman's 'insensitive' constructivism:
Goodman would have to claim that what perception can do 
depends on what it learns to do, and that there is no 
limit to what perception can learn. But that argument 
is false. There are clear limits to the extent of 
perceptual rearrangement to which human beings can 
adapt. We cannot change the way we perceive optical 
information, nor can we arbitrarily change our motor 
responses to it, regardless of the amount of time or 
effort we might invest in doing so (1986, 165).
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Michael Kubovy clearly illustrates that the mathematical rules of 
perspective do not inscribe untranscendable laws. They are, quite 
the contrary, shaped and even distorted by the constraints of 
human's perceptual system. With regard to Kubovy’s mathematical 
analyses even the most rigorously drawn perspective rendering 
violates the rules of projective construction in depicting human 
bodies and cylindrical structures. For, the perceptual system, while 
experiencing no problem with rectangular settings of architectural 
environment, does not accept the correct central projection of human 
bodies and cylindrical columns as 'realistic.' Consequently, many 
well-known artists of the Renaissance drew human figures from a 
center of projection irrelevant to the total perspective structure 
of the picture. This is what Kubovy terms as 'the primacy of 
perception’ denoting the fact that any language of representation 
can be constructed if only it resides within the boundaries of what 
human perception can accomplish (1986, 120-1). In the context of 
linear perspective 'correctly constructed' human figures are 
pictorial elements outside the acceptable limits of the visionary 
system. Such figures are drawn in accordance to a different set of 
techniques other than the strict rules of central projection. 
Kubovy, along with Gombrich, utilises this cue against the common 
belief in the total arbitrariness of all the representational 
techniques as well as linear perspective. In this sense, while it is 
possible to construct even innumerable 'forms' of pictorial 
depiction this does not imply that the kind of graphic elements 
available for the representation of a specific object is totally 
limitless. It is not possible to devise any form of pictorial 
representation arbitrarily without considering the basic constraints 
of the visual system.
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In addition to the argimient of the perceptual limitations, Gombrich 
attributes an aspect of causality to the system of linear 
perspective which he formulates as the ‘negative rule of 
objectivity.' In his article "Standards of Truth," Gombrich 
illustrates that it is not possible to decide exactly on what a 
perspective rendering may really convey about the subject spectacle; 
but the question becomes easier if one tries to answer what the Scime 
rendering does 'not' show about the depicted scene. Accordingly, a 
photograph or an accurately constructed perspective rendering is a 
correct record of what can 'not' be seen from the specific vantage 
point which the photograph or perspective is constructed. Gombrich 
believes that this negative rule may eliminate many ill-natured 
questions about what can be pictorially represented:
5.6· O b j e c t i v i t y  of L i n e a r  P e r s p e c t i v e
I should like to propose that what I have called the 
negative principle of eye-witness record could lead to 
an agreement about the nature of perspective and its 
problematic features. According to my formula, 
perspective enables us to eliminate from our 
representation anything which could not be seen from 
one particular vantage point - which may still lave the 
question open as to what can be seen . (1982, 253-6).
This objective knowledge of occlusion, moreover, is not affected by 
the ambiguity or multivalence of the projected third dimension in 
any pictorial image. It remains available in case the depiction is 
constructed according to the rules of linear perspective.
The essential points that illustrate the relatively anti­
constructivist views of Gombrich have been briefly summarised upto 
here. While believing in the constructive function of the viewer in 
extracting spatial meanings from pictures, Gombrich happens to fall
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within a theoretical category a bit distant from the point of 
extreme constructivism. Taking Gombrich's peculiar attitude to 
pictorial representation as a vantage point the following part 
concentrates on the extreme constructivist theory adopted by Nelson 
Goodman and his followers. As formerly mentioned, due to the large 
domain through which Goodman discusses the issues about depiction, 
the scope of this section transcends the boundaries of the 
particular topic 'pictorial space' dealing with the phenomenon of 
pictorial representation in general.
5.1. Gablik’s Criticism of Gombrich
Gombrich has been subjected to severe criticisms by the 'extreme 
constructivists' who model pictorial representation as the product 
of a 'language-like' structure which does not retain even the 
slightest correspondence with the depicted portion of reality. 
Viewed from this extreme point, anything can represent any other 
thing and no style or form of depiction can be favored by the 
perceptual system as it is presumed in Gombrich's scale of learning 
ease. Having presented such a scale of acquisition Gombrich 
determines certain standards of objectivity that point to the 
acceptance of a 'real world' apart from the perceptions of the 
observer. In opposition, the essential argument of the extreme 
constructivists begins with the premise that 'no objective world can 
exist other than what the observer constructs.' This is the major 
point Suzi Gablik emphasises in her criticism of Gombrich's model in 
Progress in Art (1976). She maintains that Gombrich rests his theory 
fallaciously assuming the existence of an objective world the
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relatively realistic representation of which can be extracted using 
a number of alternative methods.
Conflicting with his constructivist appearance Gombrich founds his 
reflections, concretely, on a set of postulates which regards 
perception as the source of knowledge belonging to the real world 
that is independent of the perceiver (Gablik, 1976, 168). Indeed,
such an idea of objective world can clearly be discerned in the 
arguments of natural metaphors and the objective aspects that 
Gombrich attributes to linear perspective. Gablik criticises this 
aspect of pseudo-constructivism in Gombrich's model in her following 
words:
Gombrich's theory rests on a psychological relativism 
which is still far removed from such an idea of 
'construction.' He fails to stress sufficiently the 
sense in which the artist's thought is primarily active 
rather than merely being reactive. He stresses the role 
of subjectivity in perception without ever arriving at 
the concept of an epistemological subject whose power 
of radically assimilating physical reality allows him 
to construct it into an object of knowledge (1976,
171) .
In Gablik's model viewers do not see the same thing and interpret it 
differently, but they just see something different (1976, 172).
Every distinct memory in the part of the observer, consisting of 
various cultural and subjective experiences, brings different 
phenomenal worlds destroying the sense of any standard in accordance 
to which the correctness of representations can be checked. From 
this vantage point no special kind of depiction can 'intrinsically' 
confer ease in acquisition due the arbitrary nature the visual 
language.
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The most significant theorist of the extreme constructivist approach 
related to pictorial representation is Nelson Goodman who has 
modelled the picture-viewer relationship in terms of arbitrarily 
constructed 'symbol systems' (Hagen 1980, xxiv). Actually, Goodman 
has such an extreme and distinguished position in the area of 
constructivist thought that, within the scope of this thesis, it is 
not possible to include more than a few number of theorists in the 
category represented by him. Goodman has reflected his peculiar 
approach in a number of areas including logic, epistemology, 
psychology and arts forming an intricate model of a constructive 
subject, and he is known for his total relativism related to any 
system of representation:
5.8. Goodman’s Model of Pictorial Denotation
[Goodman] refuses to give any priority to a material 
world or to a description in terms of physics. In his 
view, physics -be it the variety put forth by 
Aristotle, Newton or Einstein- is but one version of 
the world. And this version is not inherently superior 
to versions of the world fashioned by Homer, 
Shakespeare, or James Joyce. As scientific or artistic 
creators, we do not solve the jigsaw puzzle of reality 
rather, we build endless realities out of lego (Gardner 
1982, 62).
Departing from such a relativistic assumption Goodman establishes 
his model of pictorial representation with 'symbol systems.' The 
most important treatise where Goodman establishes his language-like 
model of depiction is Languages of Art ( 1968) in which he 
illustrates how pictorial representation is essentially based on 
'denotative' aspects of graphic sign systems which are totally 
arbitrary structures of signification. In Goodman's model a picture 
is a symbol of what it represents. A picture stands for /refers to 
/denotes the object of the scene that it is said to represent and
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all these attributes of signification are absolutely independent of 
the criteria of resemblance which, above all, can not be tested. 
(Goodman 1968, 6). Goodman, in his chapter "Reality Remade"
explains, in logical terms, how resemblance in any degree cannot be 
a measure for representation'. Primarily, an object resembles itself 
to the maximum degree but rarely represents itself; resemblance is a 
reflexive property that cannot be applied to representation. 
Representation, moreover, does not share the property of ’symmetry' 
with resemblance in the sense that B is as much like A as A is like 
B if they are said to resemble each other, however, while a 
photograph can be said to represent a friend of mine 'faithfully* my 
friend can definitely not be said to represent the photograph. To 
give another example, in many cases neither one of a pair of very 
like objects represents the other: a man can not be the 
representation of another man, even his twin brother; also none of 
the perfectly similar products off an assembly line is a picture of 
any of the rest (Goodman 1968, 4). Deriving from these logical
premises Goodman discards the criteria of resemblance as being 
neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for representation.
In addition to the logical puzzle that the concept of resemblance 
confers for representation a subsequent problem is the selection of 
the aspects/properties that will be represented in the picture. 
Goodman talks about the existence of even uncountable 'properties’ 
of things in his book The Structure of Appearance (1951, 95-7). The
unresolvable question is: which properties/aspects of the object 
should be represented to achieve a successful picture of it? 
Departing from this point Goodman severely criticises the 
conventional imitation theory:
"To make a faithful picture, come as close as possible
to copying the object just as it is." This simple-
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minded injunction baffles me; for the object before me 
is a man, a swarm of atoms, a complex of cells, a 
fiddler, a friend, a fool and much more (1968, 86).
In this sense, the 'copy' theory of representation fails at its 
start by the inability to specify what is to be copied. In 
opposition to the perspectivist claim of 'the visible appearance 
within a range of 30® viewed from a predetermined point in space,' 
Goodman discards the priority of any specific aspect of an object 
over the others to be chosen for copying/representing. Any single 
property, as well as the ones extracted by the projection rules of 
linear perspective, can be equally valid to serve as a 
representation of a chosen scene. Gombrich, attributing aspects of 
objectivity to perspective construction, fails to discern this point 
and falls into the 'illusory' realism of the Renaissance rules of 
depiction. The fundamental premise that the system of Renaissance 
perspective derives its principles is that the visible light rays 
produced by the picture under specified conditions match the rays 
disseminated by the scene being depicted. However, to achieve such a 
complete match between the picture and scene 'very specific’ viewing 
conditions should be satisfied. Primarily, both the picture and the 
scene should be viewed through a peephole with one transfixed eye; 
and to construct an exact match between the two scenes two different 
sets of viewing coordinates should be established for both the 
depiction and the scene depicted. For instance, the picture is to be 
viewed face on at a distance of two meters while the 'cathedral' 
represented has to be looked at from, say, an angle of 45® to its 
façade and at a distance of sixty meters. Goodman considers these 
conditions of observation as "grossly abnormal" that can not confer 
any 'natural/objective' standard of representation: "What can be the 
grounds for taking the matching of light rays delivered under such
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extraordinary conditions as a measure of fidelity?” (1968, 13).
Above all, in accordance to Goodman’s model, even if there weren't 
any problem of viewing situations as stated above, identity in the 
pattern of light rays, like resemblance of other kinds, cannot be a 
sufficient condition for representation. Then, what is the reason 
for some theorists to consider perspective projection as a rather 
more objective method for representation and for some others as even 
the ultimate way of representing space as it is experienced by the 
human observer?
5.9. Inculcation
The supposed naturalness of linear perspective, for Goodman, is 
based on a special kind of mind-set in the part of the viewer which 
is absolutely independent of any transcendent standards of 
objectivity. Accordingly, realism, rather than being an outcome of 
any constant or absolute relationship between the depiction and the 
object, is a matter of relationship between the system of 
representation employed and the standard system most commonly used 
(1968, 38). Such a relation is present for pictures drawn in
central projection. Practice has rendered the pictorial symbols of 
perspective so transparent that nobody is aware of the act of 
'reading' codes from those so called 'realistic' pictures. This is 
what Goodman terms as "inculcation:” the temporal process through 
which the arbitrary codes of a particular type of representation 
comes to be considered natural due to its highly frequent usage. So, 
realism can be considered as a matter of "habit" (Goodman 1968, 
38). If linear perspective were totally replaced by another system 
of depiction with an equal degree of conventionality Gombrich and
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Kubovy, in this sense, have probably attributed a similar degree of 
objectivity to that system.
5.10. Panofsky's Notion of Symbolic Pictorial Forms
Here, Erwin Panofsky's famous article “Perspective as Symbolic Form“ 
(1991) deserves attention as it is one of the most influential 
treatises written on the arbitrary and culture bounded nature of 
representational techniques. The article, in Podro's words
...takes the perspective construction developed in the 
Renaissance and argues, firstly, that it has no unique 
authority as a way of organising the depiction of 
spatial relations, that it is simply part of one 
particular culture and has the same status as other 
modes of spatial depiction developed within other 
cultures. Secondly, the spatial order between 
components in a painting is the natural correlate of 
contemporaneous cosmology and modes of perception 
(1982, 186).
To establish his case of perspective as a ’symbolic' form that 
reflects the perceptual tendencies of its time Panofsky illustrates 
how our sense of sight is conditioned by our viewing habits which 
are in turn determined by the prevalent modes of representation. The 
most significant example he gives to this fact is that we never 
experience the retinal curves of the perceived environment because 
we have been grown into a pictorial culture where straight lines are 
always represented as straight. However, in reality we should have 
been ’seeing' curves and arcs due to the spherical structure of the 
eye ball, and we would really be 'seeing' them if the current 
pictorial conventions had represented the environment that way. Our 
blindness to this perceptual aspect is “surely in part due to our 
habituation -further reinforced by looking at photographs- to linear 
perspectival construction: a construction that is itself
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comprehensible only for a quite specific, indeed specifically 
modern, sense of space, or if you will, sense of the world” 
(Panofsky 1991, 34). Another important point that renders
perspective far from being a technique that depicts the visionary 
experiences is the homogeneous and infinite space that it 
constructs. Actually these two concepts are the products of the 
newly developing mathematical sciences and the Euclidean geometry of 
the Renaissance theory. However, “visual space and tactical space 
are both anisotropic and unhomogeneous in contrast to the metric 
space of Euclidean geometry: 'the main directions of organisation 
-before-behind, above-below, right-left- are dissimilar in both 
physiological spaces” (Panofsky 1991, 30). "Inculcated” by the
homogeneous and infinite space of the perspectivally constructed 
pictures the contemporary viewer 'constructs’ his phenomenal 
visionary environment in a similar way. Perspective does not 
duplicate the visionary experiences but we tend observe the 
visionary environment from 'Alberti's window' conditioned by the 
products of the current visionary culture.
In terms of the constructivist model illustrated in this section
rather than forming two distinct realms of experience both the real
world and its pictorially represented correlate mutually construct
each other forming the viewer’s total sense of reality:
That a picture looks like nature often means only that 
it looks the way nature is usually painted. Again, what 
will deceive me into supposing that an object of a 
given kind is before me depends upon what I have 
noticed about such objects, and this in turn is 
affected by the way I am used to seeing them depicted 
(Goodman 1968, 39).
In this sense, pictorial representation becomes the product of an 
’articulation of pictorial symbols' which are in turn determined by 
the cultural/conventional 'ways' of representing. A picture
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’denotes* what it represents and the tools of denotation are 
conventional to the endmost degree without even slightly moving 
towards the nature pole on Gombrich's imaginary scale of nature- 
convention. Albert Cook emphasises the similar point in his example 
about the pictorial representation of grass:
...we are caught in sets of conventional cues if we are 
viewers, of conventional techniques if we are painters, 
in handling the color green and certain strokes of the 
brush, or black ink and certain lines of the engraver's 
tools, so as somewhat arbitrarily to "represent" grass 
in ways that may or may not make the artefact 
convincingly or plausibly resemble blades growing in 
the field. Further, to represent grass at all in an art 
work is a fairly advanced choice, and one not made in 
most early societies [emphasis added] (1989, 5).
Panofsky has established a three-levelled model of historically 
analysing the meanings of art works the first level of which is 
reserved for those 'conventional cues' of representing objects. He 
terms this first level of interpretation as the act of pre- 
iconographical description through which the art historian reflects 
on the manner in which, under varying historical conditions, objects 
were expressed by forms. To unveil the representational meanings of 
the depicted forms the historian should posses sound knowledge 
related to the history of style without which he is absolutely 
desperate in his search after any pictorial meaning (Panofsky 1939, 
15). Wittkower, emphasises the similar point in his book 
interpretation of Visual Symbols:
One must know that the wavy lines in the 11th-century 
Bamberg Apocalypse denotes 'sea,' just as one must know 
or have learned to see that the iridescent patches of 
colour in a picture by Turner mean the same thing. 
Without such knowledge the beholder is faced with 
unintelligible representational phenomena [emphasis 
added] (1977, 176-7).
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The chapters from 2 to 5 have structured the existing theoretical 
approaches to pictorial space perception into 4 main models. The 
variable of classification has been the degree of 
projectivism/constructivism displayed by the proponents of each 
approach. Accordingly, Gibson's model of pictorial invariants, 
Gestalt theory of pictorial space construction, Gombrich's 
information processing model and Goodman's arbitrary system of 
pictorial denotation respectively form the stages of a whole 
theoretical field which ranges within the scale delimited by the 
projective and the constructivist extremes.
The objective of this last chapter is to re-establish the 
theoretical framework of the thesis as a brief summary. With the 
help of this abbreviated version of the whole comparison a number of 
important points will be emphasised and a more comprehensive 
overview of the four models will be constructed.
6.1. Summary
James Gibson's model of pictorial space perception stands on the 
extreme point of the projective approach which claims the 
naturalness/directness of perceiving pictorial space. Accordingly, a
CHAPTER 6
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picture succeeds as a representation of ordinary objects and scenes 
because it contains the 'same kind of information’... as is provided 
by the light reflected from the ordinary environment.
In Gibsonian theory space is a function of movement. Accordingly, 
perception does not begin with a flat picture but with a general 
structure and behavior of light patterns that we 'directly* 
experience as a function of our 'moving body.' The underlying logic 
of the perceived counter-movement of the projected light patterns 
makes the observer aware of the 'unchanging/invariant' structure of 
space. These invariants form the basis of all spatial perception 
whereas static retinal forms themselves do not constitute any 
significance at all.
As evident with regard to the above brief Gibson's model of spatial 
perception is not a 'psychological' model in the first place. 
Actually, this is quite a logical consequence of his regarding 
'physiology' as something irrelevant to understanding the perceptual 
phenomena. For Gibson, what goes on through the retinae and the 
neurological structures of the brain are obscure processes that no 
scientist can perfectly understand and model. Our mind is a black 
box. Gibson, above all, does not deem the revelation of these 
physiological mechanisms as something crucial. What we experience as 
our ’phenomenal world' possesses every information that we need in
understanding the basic mechanisms of spatial perception.
Departing from these premises Gibson recourses to a unique aspect of
the human observer on which he can base all his theory of perception 
without falling into the muddle physiology: motion. Actually, motion
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is such a strong cue in revealing the spatial structure of the 
concrete environinent that Gibson has no difficulty in forming a 
totally motion-oriented model of space. What remains for him is to 
construct an optical theory in which he has to determine the 
potentials of the moving observer in unveiling the spatial structure 
of the visible world. In this context, he figures out the 
invariants: the aspects of the perceived environment that do not get 
affected by viewpoint shifts such as texture gradients, basic 3-d 
structures of objects, the horizon line, etc. By moving throughout 
the environment the observer 'directly' discerns these invariant 
aspects of space without the need to carryout any cognitive 
constructions. Extraction of the invariants is an unlearned activity 
of every 'seeing' organism that has the ability to 'move.'
Gibson bases his theory of pictorial space on the similar notion of 
invariants. Actually, while the observer's interaction with the 
visible environment is something time-bounded depending on the 
continually transforming patterns of light, the invariants 
themselves are 'timeless.' Through its constantly changing 
projective retinal input what we perceive is, say, a 
constant/invarying table that has four corners and a gradient of 
texture. In this sense, the Gibsonian invariants can easily be 
conveyed on two dimensional graphic surfaces. The difference is that 
the former has to be extracted through movement whereas the latter, 
if drawn properly, is directly represented by lines and textures. An 
outline drawn figure, in this sense, represents those aspects of an 
object that would remain invariant if it were viewed through motion. 
After building such a correspondence, Gibson attributes the similar 
naturalness to the perception of pictorial space. Thus, we do not
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have to learn how to 'read* a correctly drawn picture because it 
shares an important aspect with the ordinary act of perception: the 
invariants.
By constructing his model of pictorial space on the notion of 
invariants Gibson explains a number of pictorial phenomena about 
which the sense-based theory proved insufficient. For instance, in 
Gibsonian model a depiction, to represent space correctly, should 
not necessarily duplicate the captured projective light patterns of 
the related scene as it is not the prerequisite of constructing 
pictorial space. A representation, in its internal consistency, 
should refer to the environmental invariants and this can be 
established by many different methods of which linear perspective is 
only one kind.
Besides its such an essential effectiveness Gibsonian model, however 
fails in a number of respects. Such failures are due to Gibson’s 
neglect of physiology as being an irrelevant concept about 
perceptual issues. This leads the way to a strictly limited model of 
pictorial space which describes even a less number of facts than the 
number of which it disregards. In many experiments it has been found 
out that perceivers 'add* non-exiting information to pictorial 
displays. Amodal completion, as explained in the section 3.2, is 
such a phenomenon which the argument of invariants itself can not 
elucidate. Moreover, this points to the existence of certain 
'constructive' operations of the perceptual system in opposition to 
the Gibsonian 'direct' theory. Gibson, rather than adding 
physiological elements to his 'pure' pictorial theory based on 
motion, prefers to exclude such events from his model by calling
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them as 'ecologically invalid* evidences that can not be 
representative of the natural act of vision.
Consequently, Gibsonian theory proves to be a phenomenological 
account of how we become aware of the spatial structures of 
environment and how this is reflected on 2 dimensions. In Gibson's 
framework human physiology becomes so transparent that the whole 
model establishes its arguments 'outside' the human mind; and this 
makes Gibsonian theory the extreme projectivist approach with its 
emphasis on the totally unconstrained directness of pictorial space 
perception.
In opposition to the Gibson's optical theory of pictorial space 
Gestalt approaches to the notion of projectivism from the viewpoint 
of human physiology. In terms of the general Gestalt theory of 
perception the light rays emitted from the outer world are projected 
on a sensitive neural area of the human brain which are in turn 
subjected to a kind of organisation process leading to the final 
percept. This formulation seemingly implies a 'constructivist' 
approach to visual perception by modelling space as a 'construct' of 
human neurophysiology. However, the neural processes that Gestalt 
models are not acquired functions but they are innately founded 
abilities of the human brain. This makes Gestalt a 
projective/naturalist theory though being less radical than the 
Gibsonian one.
Departing from the above stated premises Gestalt theorists attribute 
every observed phenomenon to a specific neural process occurring in 
the brain. The well-known Gestalt principle of isomorphism enables
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the theorist to 'describe' in detail what goes on throughout the 
neural field of the perceiver by merely referring to phenomenal 
observations.^ Consequently, Gestalt has formulated a body of 
unlearned laws in accordance to which the projected light patterns 
of the visible environment are transformed into properly perceived 
layouts of space. And these laws were attributed to the behavioral 
patterns of the related neural areas of the human brain. In contrast 
to the Gibsonian theory of mobile vision the whole Gestalt theory is 
based on 'static' projections captured on a 2-dimensional sensitive 
surface. Thus, the perceptual theory of Gestalt directly applies to 
its pictorial space model.
One fundamental law of Gestalt in accordance to which a graphic 
configuration transforms into a spatial scene is the 'neural 
tendency towards simplicity.' Accordingly, any stimulus pattern 
tends to be seen in such a way that the resulting structure is as 
'simple' as the given conditions permit. In other words, if it is 
simpler to perceive a 2-dimensional drawing as a 3-dimensional 
object the perceiver prefers the latter. This forms the basic 
Gestalt principle of pictorial space construction which is presented 
as an innately founded physiological disposition of human brain: the 
tendency towards neural relaxation. A subsequent Gestalt law that 
supports the simplicity principle is that the perceiver's 
apprehension of a graphic surface does not depend on the capturing 
of separate parts but perceiving it as a 'whole.' Deriving from 
these points innumerable Gestalt criteria of objective simplicity, 
such as right angledness, parallelism, coplanarity, etc. have been 
formulated. The artist who knows how to depict space, in this sense.
 ^The Gestaltian notion of isomorphism is based on llic claim that llic outer (environmental) and inner (neural) phenomena have similar structures and are dominated by tlie same rules
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can be said to posses genuine information of how the physiology of 
vision reacts to certain 'complex' patterns.
One important issue to be pointed out in relation to the Gestalt 
model of pictorial space is that while it seems to present a perfect 
•physiological' description of the picture-viewer relationship a 
closer look reveals that it actually does not. Gestalt laws of 
pictorial space construction are all derived from phenomenological 
observations and are illustrated as the outcomes of a model of human 
neurophysiology which is itself 'fictional.' This is due to the 
concept of 'isomorphism' which dominates the Gestalt paradigm. After 
accepting that the perceived phenomena and its underlying 
physiological mechanisms have similar forms all remains is to 
formulate 'common-sense' rules of pictorial organisation and to 
attribute them to 'similar' neurological processes. Actually, there 
is no single Gestalt experiment that really investigates what goes 
on throughout the neurones of the optical cortex. The philosophy of 
isomorphism suffices for Gestalt to construct its ’graceful' model 
of pictorial perception which is based on the principle of 
simplicity itself: to describe the pictorial phenomena and their 
physiological bases in terms of similar laws is the 'simplest' 
approach to modelling the picture-viewer relationship no matter if 
this leads to an imaginary model of human neurophysiology.
By formulating such a graceful and simple model of picture-viewer 
relationship with well-defined laws of graphic organisation, Gestalt 
constitutes the most commonly referred theory in the realm of 
pictorial arts and graphic design. All the phenomena related to 
design and composition can perfectly be modelled referring to
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Gestalt theory one significant instance of which is Arnheim's 
influential treatise Art and Visual Perception. Actually, Gestalt 
claim of 'physiological' description is something quite appealing to 
many art theorists who seek justification for their arguments 
related to the principles of 2-dimensional composition. However, 
when it comes to investigating what really goes on within the mind 
of the beholder Gestalt proves quite far from being scientific. The 
need for a different procedure of inquiry other than 
phenomenological introspection arises.
To illustrate such a scientific approach the chapter in title 
"Beholder's Share" presents the constructivist model of pictorial 
space perception which is based on the premises of information­
processing theory. The primary evidence that the supporters of this 
approach have brought forth against Gibson and Gestalt is that human 
perceivers can see a too small amount of the visible environment at 
an instance to capture it immediately as a whole. Actually, evidence 
suggests that we 'read' the graphic surface by shifting our gaze 
over it capturing separate parts and unifying them through our 
minds. Viewed from this point Gibsonian concept of absolute 
directness and Gestalt law of 'wholes' both define problemmatic 
notions.
The evidence related to the 'limited angle of sight' points to the 
existence of a visual 'memory' in the part of the perceiver which is 
probably used in merging separately captured visual information. 
Such a concept of 'memory' formas the essence of chapter 4's 
constructivist model which is something completely disregarded in 
Gibsonian and Gestalt theories. By neglecting this fact both Gibson
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and Arnheim (Gestalt) have escaped from modelling the well-known 
issue of cultural factors that influence perception. Different ways 
of seeing may point to different memories and this idea is the 
essence of the information-processing theory of pictorial space.
Information-processing theory does not intend to model the 
'hardware' (physiology) of human mind but it tries to figure out the 
basic routines/softwares on which the act of perception is based. To 
reach such an aim it constructs an elementary model of visual 
perception based on the continual interactions between a Short Term 
Memory and a Long Term Memory. While the former is used in unifying 
the separately captured visual snapshots the function of the latter 
is to store a directory of 'learned pictorial conventions' to be 
used in decoding the graphic language of the confronted depiction. 
The model itself implies that to perceive the real and pictorial 
space requires 'different Long Term Memories' and the latter is 
something more culture bounded than the former. The basic 'effort 
after meaning' that every human displays in scanning a picture may 
be something innate but the manner of scanning and meaning 
construction definitely differ among cultures, conventions and 
periods.
All the assumptions that establish the information-processing model 
of pictorial space are based on experimental evidences and they 
point to the basic working mechanisms of the perceptual software. 
Forming such a scientific base that avoids tacit assumptions it is 
the theory that can model the highest amount of phenomena without 
directly excluding any single evidence. In this sense, as opposed to 
the strictly defined boundaries of Gestalt Information-processing
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theory proposes a model of picture-viewer relationship which is open 
to further development. However, it should be pointed out that 
information-processing itself cannot propose a model for the 
analysis of such issues like design or composition which are still 
in the domain of Gestalt.
The three models of pictorial space considered upto here have all 
inscribed *causal' theories of depiction presenting different 
degrees of causality. While Gibson has talked about a totally 
unconstrained relation between the real and pictorial space, 
Gombrich (within the info-processing approach),despite his notion of 
'beholder's share', implied the existence of certain standards of 
objectivity in depiction. The last chapter in title "Denoted Space" 
presents the extreme constructivist model of graphic perception in 
which there is no causal relation between pictures and reality. 
Accordingly, anyting can represent any other thing and this is not a 
matter of objective correspondence.
The leading theorist of this approach is Nelson Goodman who has 
constructed a perfectly defined system of 'pictorial denotation' in 
his book Languages of Art, In Goodman's system there can not be an 
objective world apart from what the perceiver constructs, let alone 
any objective method of depiction. Accordingly, a picture stands for 
/refers to /denotes the object of the scene that it is said to 
represent and all these attributes of signification are absolutely 
independent of the criteria of resemblance which, above all, can not 
be tested. The different ways of depiction are motivated by certain 
conventional determinants none of which can claim a more inherent 
relation with the 'outer reality.'
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In Goodman's model pictorial realism, rather than being an outcome 
of any constant or absolute relationship between the depiction and 
the object, is a matter of relationship between the system of 
representation employed ànd the standard system most commonly used. 
In other words, what we accept as the most realistic method of 
depiction is the one to which we are mostly accustomed. This is what 
Goodman terms as "inculcation:" the temporal process through which 
the arbitrary codes of a particular type of representation comes to 
be considered natural due to its highly frequent usage.
Goodman's approach resembles the Gibsonian one in terms of the non- 
psychological deed it presents. The whole system of pictorial 
denotation isolates itself from the mechanistic processes of 
picture-viewer relationship and constructs a linguistic model based 
on the articulation of arbitrary symbolic structures. In this sense, 
Goodman's theoretical domain proves to be quite different than the 
ones inquired by Gestalt and information-processing models of 
pictorial space. Strictly formulating the absolutely conventional 
nature of graphic representation Goodman proceeds to form his model 
of pictorial language within the theoretical sphere of symbol 
systems.
6.2. Conclusion
The theory of pictorial representation and graphic design is 
dominated by a constant reference to the 'psychology of perception' 
as a rich source in elucidating the relationship between the picture 
and the observer. However, contemporary psychology is quite far from 
providing a single and transcendent model of pictorial vision that
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can be applied to every single case. As it has been illustrated 
throughout the main chapters of this thesis pictorial perception is 
described within a number of different models all dominated by 
different arguments and premises. The basic problem that the present 
study considered as its departure point has been the inconsistent 
usage of this fragmented database through the field of pictorial 
arts and graphic design. As mentioned in the first chapter many 
authors treat psychology as a 'flexible reference book' from which 
every required information that is adaptable to various contexts can 
easily be derived regardless of the theoretical frameworks those 
pieces of information stem from.
To stimulate an awareness in the reader of art theory about this 
different models this study has structured the existing approaches 
to pictorial perception within four models taking projectivism- 
constructivism as a variable of classification. These four models 
have been evaluated in terms of how they handle the phenomenon of 
'pictorial space' as a significant feature of graphic imagery.
A consciousness about these different models in the part of the 
reader persuades him/her to 'perceive' the diverse written material 
in the field of pictorial theory within a relatively comprehensive 
framework. By this way every single theoretical study acquires a 
place within a structured theoretical field rather then forming a 
distinct model itself.
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